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INTRODUCTION
In this sixth edition of this report on the U.S. gold industry
the focus is shifted slightly from that of previous editions.
While this edition still looks at industry developments,
economic impacts, trends in production costs and public
policies affecting the industry like previous editions, it is
the latter issue that is most prominent in this edition. The
low price environment that began in 1996 continues to
pressure the industry and communities dependent upon it.
The industry and these communities could reasonably be
described as having been in a recession since 1997 while
the rest of the U.S. economy has boomed. This regional
recession, primarily affecting the rural western U.S., has
seen job losses, mine closures, reduced state and local tax
revenues, and the general economic uncertainty that is
usually associated with hard times.
In spite of these problems, through rationalization of
operations, the synergy of mergers, and other measures, the
industry has improved its financial performance in 1999 and
2000. Results in 2001 are only partially available at the time
of this writing, but early indications are that the remaining
major producers continued to benefit from streamlined
operations as well as an improvement in gold prices in the
last quarter of the year. The industry appears prepared to
ride out the recession in the near term without significant
reductions in overall production and only moderate
reductions in economic impacts relative to changes in prices.
In short, discussions of the demise of the U.S. gold industry
are premature.
Longer-term prospects are more problematic. The
European Central Bank agreement may well be renewed,
but sales under the current agreement are limited to
historically unprecedented high levels. Continued low gold
prices after the expiration of the European Central Bank
agreement limiting gold sales in 2004 would pose significant
problems, for example. However, it is changes in the
regulatory environment that occurred during the Clinton
administration that most seriously threaten the industry’s
long-run sustainability in the U.S.
This shift in focus to public policy and regulatory
issues is necessitated, in the author’s view, because changes
in the industry regulatory environment likely foreshadow
significant changes in the structure, conduct and
performance of the industry in the U.S. More specifically,
we are referring to proposed changes in federal Surface
Management regulations contained in 43 C.F.R. § 3809
(“3809 regulations”) and the U.S. Department of the Interior
Solicitor’s “millsite” opinion issued in November 1997.
These regulatory changes have coincided with
increases in industry concentration in terms of the percentage
of output produced by the largest producers and increased
consolidation of producers through mergers, acquisitions
and bankruptcies, and have led to a virtual cessation of
grassroots exploration in the U.S. Workforce reductions,
mine closures, and reduced exploration quite naturally reflect
depressed gold and silver markets. However, changes in the
regulatory environment adopted in the final years of the
Clinton administration, if they were to remain in effect,
would make it unlikely that the industry could regain the
vitality it had in the 1980s even if the price were to return to
1980s levels. Hence, at the crux of these developments is
the fundamental sustainability of the industry in the U.S.
In many ways industry developments in the post-
1996 period provide a textbook example of the dynamics
of what economists refer to a “perfectly competitive
industry.” This is an industry characterized by relatively
few barriers to industry entry or exit by producers and
consumers, little or no ability on the part of producers to
influence price, and product homogeneity. Although the
analogy is by no means perfect, what we have observed
over the past two decades has been:
 1) Exogenous factors, in this case inflation-driven
demand for gold, pushed market prices well over
industry production costs. In the late 1970s and early
1980s this demand was almost entirely met from
world mine supply, which was considerably smaller
than current levels, rather than from above-ground
stocks which still played a significant monetary role
for many, especially European, central banks.
2) The price increases led to rapid entry of new
producers and expansion of existing producers in the
1980s. This entry and expansion was fueled by tens
of billions of dollars in capital expenditures. In
Nevada alone, the nation’s largest producer with
approximately 75 percent of current production, an
estimated $13 billion has been invested. The figure
for the U.S. is conservatively estimated at twice that
level. (The disproportionate relationship between
current production and total investment stems from
the fact that relatively more mines outside of Nevada
have ceased production and were generally less
successful.)
3) Rapid expansion of industry output in the U.S. as
indicated by the graph on the cover of this publication
coincided with expansion of world mine supply.
World mine supply increased from 31 million ounces
(962 tonnes) in 1980, (Murray and others, 1990) to
82.6 million ounces (2,568 tonnes) in 2000 and U.S.
production increased from 1.4 million ounces (44
tonnes) in 1980 to 10.9 million ounces (340 tonnes)
in 2000.4
4) Increases in supply from underground and above-
ground sources led to a significant decline in prices
at the time of this writing, approximately $270/troy
ounce that leaves gold at the lowest real price since
the early 1970s, shortly after the collapse of Bretton
Woods agreement when it was fixed at $35 per ounce.
5) A “shake-out” of less competitive, generally higher-
cost producers but also firms with unsuccessful
exploration records. At this time fully half of world
mine supply is unprofitable on a full cost basis.
(Klapwijk and others, 2000)  Barring a rebound in
prices, this trend is expected to continue as high cost
producers drop out, producing orebodies are
exhausted, and fewer new orebodies can be brought
into production because of low prices, regulatory
barriers, and a lack of exploration efforts.
We note that the description of the industry as a “perfectly
competitive industry” is flawed for a number of reasons.
First, and foremost, this process, once set in motion by
exogenous factors, was not directed purely by its own
internal dynamics like the textbook description of a
“perfectly competitive industry.”  Overlaying these
traditional economic foci are regulatory and political
changes, both domestic and international, that have
influenced the process. For example, were it simply a
matter of mine production affecting precious metals
markets conditions, it is likely that the boom would still
be in progress. Over the past decade 30 to 40 percent of
world physical demand for gold has been met from sources
other than mine supply, i.e., central banks and producer
hedging. But, the exogenous macroeconomic conditions
that increased demand and raised the price in the early
1980s, i.e., inflation, subsided. In the 1990s bond and
equity markets and the U.S. dollar replaced gold as a safe
haven for wealth, resulting in a significant decline in
investment demand in the developed world. In addition,
new exogenous macroeconomic and political
developments led to the formation of the European Central
Bank out of the most gold heavy central banks in the world,
and have made much of the gold held in European
Monetary Union (EMU) members’ central banks
unnecessary for foreign exchange purposes. The majority
of foreign trade of EMU members is among themselves.
Hence, once a common currency is introduced, the demand
for foreign exchange holdings is diminished. As a result,
EMU members’ central banks have mobilized their gold
holdings and increased supply.
Second, because of the industry’s own unique
internal dynamics and perhaps its corporate culture, the
industry’s expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s
prompted a reaction from environmental interest groups.
For a wide variety of reasons, the internal dynamics of
interest group politics has seen a coalescence of
environmental interests around mining law reform and
regulatory issues. These developments, as much or more
than the traditional subject matter of mineral economics,
threaten the industry’s survival. To put it more succinctly,
while the industry is capable of surviving $250 gold and
sub $5 silver—although not generally profitably—it is not
likely to survive the regulatory climate created in the last
years of the Clinton administration. All of these actions,
which are discussed in detail below, bring into question
both the short-term survival and long-term sustainability
of the industry.
Although the “perfectly competitive industry”
comparison may not seem to portend well for the industry,
a more positive outlook is warranted, particularly for the
U.S. industry. On the crucial regulatory front, the reforms
pushed through in the last days of the Clinton
administration have been reopened for public comment and
review and some significant provisions were dropped at
the end of 2001. Hence, there is at least a prospect of seeing
less radical reform. A window of opportunity, however, is
not a reprieve, and there are reasons to doubt that the new
administration will be willing to risk much for such a small
industry with a small political constituency. Indicative of
this small political base is the fact that approximately three-
quarters of U.S. gold production occurs in a single
congressional district. In addition, it is a solidly Republican
district and, hence, not “in play” politically, and not likely
to attract significant political favors from either party.
In addition, while the “shake-out” phase of the cycle
implies diminished employment, lower taxes paid in
communities affected by mining, bankruptcies,
reorganizations, mergers, and takeovers, it must be recalled
that the history of the cycle is simply that it is a cycle, not
a secular trend. While some have argued that the
demonetization of gold in Europe and North America may
signal the start of a secular trend, strong gold demand has
absorbed the substantial increases in mine and aboveground
supply of the past two decades. Hence, gold still performs
its traditional role as a store of value for much of the world’s
population that lacks the relatively sound monetary and
banking systems of developed economies. As the partial
recovery of gold prices to over $300 after the events of
September 11, 2001, the ensuing war on terrorism, and
events in the Middle East suggest, gold may be a “barbarous
relic,” as Keynes described it, but world events still
routinely remind us that it’s a barbarous world and that is
not likely to change soon.5
Figure 1.  Map of gold and silver mining locations (from USGS web page http://minerals.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/mapdata/precious.pdf)
Gold
Silver
The structure of the U.S. gold industry can be viewed from
several perspectives. First, as a result of geology, primary
gold production is centered in the mountainous western third
of the U.S. and particularly in the Great Basin (see Fig. 1).
Primary and identifiable by-product gold and silver
production is summarized by state in 1999 by Table 1 and
in 2000 by Table 2. The tables show that production is highly
concentrated with the top three producing states, Nevada,
with 70.9 percent of the value of total U.S. output in 1999
and 72 percent in 2000, Alaska (4.7 percent), Utah (4.5
percent) combined for 80.1 percent of the total value of
production. Expanding the list to the top five producing states
would add California with 3.6 percent and Idaho with 3.2
percent, to account for 86.9 percent of the total value of
U.S. production in 1999.
In terms of the concentration of gold production as
opposed to the value of gold and silver production, 1999 gold
production was slightly more concentrated than the value of
all production because primary silver production is included
in the precious metals production value. The top three gold-
producing states in 1999 produced 84.2 percent of U.S.
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production. These included Nevada with 75.2 percent, Alaska
with 4.7 percent, and Utah with 4.2 percent. The top five
producers would include California with 4.0 percent and
Colorado, where the Cripple Creek/Victor Mine alone accounts
for 2.1 percent. Hence, the top five producing states accounted
for 90.2 percent of production. Furthermore, it should be noted
that since Utah’s gold and silver production is a by-product of
copper mining at Kennecott’s Bingham Canyon Mine outside
of Salt Lake City, these figures understate the geographic
concentration of primary gold production.
As a result of mine closures in Montana, Idaho, South
Dakota, and other states in 2000, production figures show
slightly increased concentration in the top producing states.
In 2000 the top three states again accounted for 88.7 percent
of gold production, while the top five accounted for 94.9
percent. This trend is likely to continue under present market
and regulatory conditions. Low prices will both hasten mine
closures and provide little incentive for exploration, and the
barriers to new mines created by new federal surface
management (3809) regulations as well as some state
regulations will accelerate these trends in the future.6
Gold Percent Value Silver Percent Value Total Value Percent  of
State (1,000 oz) of Total ($1,000s) (1,000 oz) of Total ($1,000s) ($1,000s) Total Value
Alaska 517.9 4.71% 144,494 3,100 4.94% 16,182 160,676 4.7%
Arizona na na na 5,884 9.39% 30,714 30,714 0.9%
California 441 4.01% 123,011 24 0.04% 125 123,136 3.6%
Colorado 231 2.10% 64,449 na na na 64,449 1.9%
Idaho 133 1.21% 37,107 13,407 21.38% 69,985 107,092 3.2%
Montana 145 1.32% 40,399 na 0.00% na 40,399 1.2%
Nevada 8,260 75.16% 2,304,540 19,500 31.10% 101,790 2,406,330 70.9%
S. Dakota 213 1.94% 59,343 na na na 59,343 1.7%
Utah 470 4.28% 131,130 4,000 6.38% 20,880 152,010 4.5%
Washington 104 0.95% 29,016 na na na 29,016 0.9%
Other 475 4.32% 132,525 16,780 26.76% 87,592 220,117 6.5%
Total 10,989 100.00% 3,066,015 62,695 100.00% 327,268 3,393,283 100.0%
Sources: Gold Fields Mineral Services, U.S. Geological Survey, state agencies, and company reports.
“Other” includes the states for which data are not available (shown as “na”).
Table 1.  Gold and silver production in 1999 by state
Another view of industry concentration is the percentage
of output produced by individual mines and mining complexes
and mining companies. While gold is produced in hundreds
of locations in the U.S. and as a by-product of other metal
mining, both primary production and total production are
highly concentrated in a few large producing mines and mine
complexes. As indicated in Table 3, in both 1999 and 2000 the
top three producing mines and mining complexes were in
Nevada and accounted for 48.3 percent and 52.2 percent of
total U.S. production in each respective year. The largest
producer in each year was Newmont Mining’s Carlin trend
and Valmy trend operations accounting for 24.3 percent of 1999
production and 27.9 percent of 2000 production or 2.5 million
and 3.05 million ounces in the respective years. Second in
1999 was Placer Dome (60%) and Kennecott’s (40%) Cortez
operation with 1.33 million ounces. Third in 1999 was Barrick
Gold’s Betze-Post Mine with 1.13 million ounces. In 2000
Betze-Post and Cortez traded places producing 1.65 and 1.01
million ounces, respectively.
In spite of Newmont’s Carlin and Valmy trends’ top
position in each year, that ranking is problematic. The Carlin
trend actually consists of a number of distinct extractive
locations located approximately 20 miles west of Elko,
Nevada on Interstate 80 along a northwest to southeast band
extending 20 miles north and several miles south of the
Interstate. The Valmy trend represents another group of
extractive locations about 60 miles west of the Carlin trend,
which also extends approximately 20 miles north and south
of Interstate 80. In total, the Carlin and Valmy trend
operations consist of 10 extractive locations. Hence,
describing these locations as a single mine is misleading. In
addition, with the merger of Newmont and Franco-Nevada
in 2001, the Ken Snyder Mine will likely be integrated into
these operations.
However, it is difficult and probably meaningless to
some extent to try to differentiate the output of these different
points of ore extraction because they constitute a single
operating unit. Ores from each extractive location are
shipped to centralized processing locations based on the most
efficient type of process for each type of ore. Hence, sulfide
ores are shipped to autoclave processing facilities;
carbonaceous ores are shipped to a roasting facility, etc. As
a consequence, some ores at the various extractive locations
probably could not be classified as ore, that is, as being
capable of being processed at a profit, if they had to be
processed at that location. Hence, because of this
optimization, matching ore types to processing facility types,
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
Newmont acquired its Valmy trend operations in its
1997 merger with Santa Fe Pacific Gold. This optimization
process indicates one of the kinds of synergies generated
by the current wave of consolidation in the industry. Similar
results in Nevada, at least, occurred with Newmont’s merger
with Battle Mountain Gold in January 2001. With this merger
Newmont acquired the undeveloped Phoenix deposit with
over 6 million ounces of reserves calculated at $300 per
ounce located between its Carlin and Valmy trend operations.
Newmont will be able to develop extractive operations and
integrate it into its processing system much more cheaply
than Battle Mountain could have if it had to construct its
own processing facilities.
If one wishes to define a mine as a single location of
ore extraction, then Placer Dome and Kennecott’s Cortez
operations and Barrick Gold’s Betze-Post pit would lead the
list of top producing mines. These operations, however, are
smaller than Kennecott’s Bingham Canyon Mine, which, in
spite of ranking sixth in 1999 and fifth in 2000 in gold
production, produces gold as a by-product of copper. Bingham
Canyon is also a major producer of silver, producing 4 million
ounces in 1999 and 3.7 million ounces in 2000.7
01. Carlin/Valmy Trends (NV) Newmont 3,047.9 27.9 27.9
02. Betze-Post (NV) Barrick 1,646.6 15.1 42.9
03. Cortez (NV) Placer Dome 1,009.9 9.2 52.2
(Kennecott)
04. Meikle Barrick 805.7 7.4 59.5
05. Bingham Canyon (UT) Kennecott    700.0 6.4 65.9
06. Round Mtn. (NV) Echo Bay    640.1 5.9 71.8
(Barrick)
07. Fort Knox (AK) Kinross 363.0 3.3 75.1
08. Jerritt Canyon (NV) AngloGold    343.2 3.1 78.2
(Meridian)
09. Cripple Creek (CO) AngloGold    248.0 2.3 80.5
10. Ken Snyder (NV) Newmont    216.0 2.0 82.5
Note: Cumulative percentages may not add correctly on table because of rounding.
Table 3
Top 10 Producing Mines in 1999
Rank           Mine Operator Production Percent of Cum.
(Partner) (1,000 ozs.) U.S. Output Percent
Rank           Mine Operator Production Percent of Cum.
(Partner) (1,000 ozs.) U.S. Output Percent
Top 10 Producing Mines in 2000
01. Carlin/Valmy Trends (NV) Newmont 2,498.7 24.3 24.3
02. Cortez (NV) Placer Dome 1,328.5 12.9 37.3
(Kennecott)
03. Betze-Post (NV) Barrick 1,130.0 11.0 48.3
04. Meikle (NV) Barrick 978.0 9.5 57.8
05. Round Mtn. (NV) Echo Bay    541.8 5.3 63.1
(Barrick)
06. Bingham Canyon (UT) Kennecott    470.0 4.6 67.7
07. Jerritt Canyon (NV) AngloGold    362.9 3.5 71.2
(Meridian)
08. Fort Knox (AK) Kinross 351.1 3.4 74.6
09. Ken Snyder (NV) Newmont    260.0 2.5 77.2
10. Cripple Creek (CO) AngloGold    231.0 2.3 79.4
Production Percent Value Production Percent Value Total Value Percent of
State (1,000 oz) of Total ($1,000s) (1,000 oz) of Total ($1,000s) ($1,000s) Total Value
Alaska ￿546 4.81 148,976 18,227 27.52 83,660 232,636 6.8%
California ￿447 3.94 121,882 23 0.04 107 121,989 3.6%
Colorado ￿248 2.19 67,667 na na na 67,667 2.0%
Idaho ￿72 0.63 19,645 12,905 19.48 59,233 78,878 2.3%
Montana ￿212 1.87 57,926 na na na 57,926 1.7%
Nevada ￿8,585 75.65 2,342,417 23,200 35.03 106,488 2,448,905 72.0%
S. Dakota ￿171 1.51 46,630 na na na 46,630 1.4%
Utah ￿700 6.17 190,995 3,939 5.95 18,080 209,075 6.4%
Washington ￿94 0.83 25,675 na na na 25,675 0.8%
Other ￿274 2.41 74,761 7,936 11.98 36,428 111,189 3.3%
￿￿ ￿
Total ￿1 1,349 100.00 3,096,575 66,230 100.00 303,996 3,400,570 100.0%
Sources: Gold Fields Mineral Services, U.S. Geological Survey, state agencies, and company reports.
“Other” includes the states for which data are not available (shown as “na”).
Table 2.  Gold and silver production in 2000 by state
Gold Silver8
While only a two-year trend, the increased
concentration in the industry illustrated by the table can be
compared to 1997 when the top three producing mines,
Newmont’s Carlin and Valmy trend complex and Barrick’s
Betze-Post and Meikle Mines, produced 43.9 percent of U.S.
output vs. 52.2 percent in 2000. This trend is the result of a
combination of factors that are likely to continue unless there
is a significant change in prices and the regulatory
environment. The largest producers are, first and foremost,
those that have staked out the most productive ground with
the largest reserves. These large-scale reserves offer
significant economies of scale best illustrated by Newmont’s
optimization of its operations on the Carlin and Valmy trends.
Barrick’s contiguous operations at the open-pit Betze-Post
Mine and the underground Meikle Mine offer similar
economies by virtue of shared processing facilities. Similar
economies can be achieved without common ownership and
contiguous operations as when Placer Dome/Kennecott’s
Cortez Mine ships ore to AngloGold/Meridian’s Jerritt
Canyon Mine’s mill for processing. However, this is an
exceptional arrangement brought about by the low price and
surplus processing capacity at Jerritt Canyon.
The trend toward consolidation is expected to
continue because these large-scale operations have large
reserves and are “permitted,” i.e., they have operating
permits from state and federal regulators on the facilities
they operate. This means they can continue developing
reserves in an economically defined operating area and
operate at current or higher levels of production for the next
five to ten years. In addition, smaller producers lack the
benefits of economies of scale associated with large deposits,
and must acquire permits to develop new, nonadjacent claims
that generally cannot use existing infrastructure. Because
the U.S. permitting process has become relatively onerous
both in terms of the cost and the time required compared to
other countries, smaller producers have largely chosen to
invest overseas rather than in equal opportunities in the U.S.
As cases in point, Hecla Mining is relying on investments
in South America to replace its closing U.S. production, as
are Meridian Gold, Glamis Gold, and numerous other
“junior” and mid-sized producers. Dealing with the costs of
the U.S. permitting process can be prohibitive for smaller
companies and these costs will promote concentration in
the industry in the U.S.
Another cost that has become an increasingly
important barrier to entry by smaller producers is energy
costs. The industry is very energy intensive, using large
quantities of electric power for mineral processing and mine
dewatering. In Nevada, for example, the industry used over
300 megawatts of power in 2000, approximately 25 percent
of the capacity of the system in northern Nevada. Because
the industry is located in the western U.S. in and near
California, producers have seen significant increases in
power costs as a consequence of energy shortages.
Large producers are able to secure lower power rates
and, in some cases, are considering investments in generation
facilities and co-generation alternatives. In addition, a law
passed by the Nevada Legislature would allow major
electricity consumers to purchase power from any supplier
rather than the regulated monopoly supplier if it can
demonstrate that other consumers will not be harmed. It is
likely that only larger producers will be able to take
advantage of this option. Hence energy costs constitute an
emerging barrier to entry and a factor that will hasten the
exit of junior and mid-sized producers from the U.S., leading
to increased concentration in the future.
This does not mean that “juniors” and mid-sized
producers will be unsuccessful or unprofitable as they move
offshore. Meridian Gold, for example, has opened a very
low cost mine in Chile as it closes down its operations in
Idaho at the Beartrack Mine. Meridian’s stock has been one
of the best performing stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange during a period of market and industry malaise.
Similarly, Glamis Gold, Hecla, and others have new
production in South America that will increase their
production and bolster their financial statements. The point
is that the lack of a substantial U.S. reserve base and
infrastructure, and barriers to entry created by the regulatory
environment make expansion in the U.S. impractical for
“junior” producers. Hence, as junior producers’ reserves are
exhausted, the market share of the majors like Newmont,
Barrick, Placer, and AngloGold will increase.
Evidence of this trend toward increased concentration
of U.S. production is augmented by concentration measures
based on company rather than mine production. While the
top three mines and mining complexes accounted for 48.3
percent and 52.2 percent of production in 1999 and 2000,
respectively, the top three mining companies accounted for
58.9 percent and 62.0 percent of U.S. gold production in
1999 and 2000, respectively. The obvious cause of these
higher levels of concentration was multiple mine ownership
by the major producers, which was largely due to mergers
and acquisitions in the industry over the past several years.
The two largest producing companies in both 1999
and 2000 were, in rank order, Newmont and Barrick with a
combined share of U.S. gold production of 47.4 percent and
51.5 percent in the respective years. Placer Dome was third
in 1999 to bring the share of U.S. production of the top three
to 58.9 percent. Placer Dome slipped to fourth in 2000 behind
Kennecott which was fourth in 1999, because of the
suspension of mining at Placer’s Getchell Mine in Nevada
and a significant increase in gold production from
Kennecott’s Bingham Canyon copper mine in Utah. The fifth
largest U.S. producer in both years was Homestake Mining.
The share of U.S. production accounted for by these five
companies was 73.9 percent in 1999 and 76.6 percent in 2000.
The discussion of the trends toward increased
concentration of output in (i) Nevada, or (ii) the largest mines
and mining complexes, or (iii) the largest mining companies,9
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Figure 2.  Direct and indirect employment impacts of gold and
silver production in selected years.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
suggests by all measures that concentration is increasing.
For example, the merger of Barrick Gold and Homestake
Mining in mid 2001 marginally increased concentration as
measured by company output. The resulting increase in U.S.
concentration will only be marginal in spite of the fact that
it moved Barrick over Newmont in worldwide production,
because Homestake’s production is largely outside the U.S.
Barrick’s ascent to number one North American producer
based on worldwide production was short lived, however.
In early 2002 Newmont outbid the world’s largest producer,
AngloGold, for Australia’s largest producer, Normandy
Mining. The acquisition included Franco-Nevada which held
approximately 20 percent of Normandy and a substantial
stake in Echo Bay Mines as well as royalties on the output
of Barrick and other producers. This acquisition made
Newmont the world’s largest gold producer and, not
coincidently, increased world wide industry concentration
as well.
This concentration should not be considered an anti-
trust problem because U.S. gold producers account for only
just over 13 percent of world mine supply in 1999 of 2,576
tonnes (82.8 million ounces). Indeed, total world mine
production is less than 2 percent of available aboveground
stocks of 140,000 tonnes (4.5 billion ounces). (Klapwijk and
others, 2000, p. 32–33)  Hence, this degree of concentration
gives U.S. producers and even all world producers combined
no pricing power. This degree of concentration is also not
likely to offer producers any significant monopsony (a single
buyer from multiple sellers) power as purchasers of labor,
equipment and supplies since these inputs are not unique to
precious metals mining. Increased concentration, in this case,
is simply a consequence of the phase in the commodity price
cycle in which the industry currently finds itself. It is a pattern
that can be observed in many other competitive industries
and, it should be pointed out, the precious metals industry is
still considerably less concentrated than it was in 1980 when
there were only three significant U.S. producers—
Homestake, Newmont, and Kennecott. In 2000, and in spite
of recent increases in concentration, there were almost 20
companies publicly listed on U.S. exchanges engaged in
large-scale mining activities and probably hundreds of others
engaged in smaller-scale mining.
As may be expected from the discussion of the concentration
of the industry in recent years, the economic impacts of the
industry have also become increasingly concentrated. These
impacts are measured in terms of jobs created, output
stimulated in related industries such as suppliers of
machinery, equipment and chemicals, and increases in
household earnings in communities supporting the precious
metals mining industry. Figure 2, showing the employment
impacts of gold and silver mining in selected years for the
U.S. and in Nevada, illustrates this concentration by the
diminishing difference between U.S. and Nevada impacts.
The estimates of employment impacts include direct
plus indirect jobs created by gold and silver mining in the
indicated years. The estimates are derived from the “Regional10
Alaska 13.9 2,233 1.7724 284,782 0.5103 81,993
Arizona 31.8 977 2.4518 75,306 0.8130 24,971
California 18.5 2,278 2.0508 252,528 0.5646 69,523
Colorado 36.2 2,333 2.6351 169,830 0.6961 44,863
Idaho 22.1 2,367 1.8165 194,532 0.5305 56,812
Montana 25.2 1,018 2.0217 81,675 0.5844 23,609
Nevada 19.0 45,720 1.7843 4,293,615 0.5484 1,319,631
S. Dakota 25.5 1,513 1.8352 108,907 0.5768 34,229
Utah 32.8 4,986 2.6325 400,166 0.7782 118,294
Washington 22.2 644 1.8854 54,707 0.5574 16,174
Other 20.2 4,446 1.8660 410,738 0.5646 124,278
Total 68,516 6,326,785 1,914,377
Implied Multipliers 20.19 1.8660 0.5646
Table 4.  Economic impacts of 1999 gold and silver production.
State Jobs Jobs Output Output Earnings Earnings
Multiplier Multiplier ($1,000s) Multiplier ($1,000s)
Impacts Modeling System” (RIMS) developed by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce
(1992) and are intended to reflect the change in final demand
for, in this case, labor, in a given state resulting from a change
in income in that state from a particular sector, in this case
mining. Because most of the output of gold and silver mining
is sold outside of the state in which it is produced it is
considered an export good for that state and represents a net
injection of income into the state.
Indeed, the U.S. as a whole is a net exporter of gold.
In 1999, for example, the U.S. imported 221 tonnes of gold
and exported 523 tonnes, for net exports of 302 tonnes or
9.7 million ounces. The difference between U.S. net exports
and domestic production of 342 tonnes in 1999, or 40 tonnes,
represents U.S. domestic consumption. Hence, over 88
percent of domestically mined gold is exported and
constitutes an injection into the national economy. (U.S.
Geological Survey, 2000)
The export nature of precious metals mining in the
U.S. and in any individual state can be contrasted to the
economic impacts of other economic activities such as
retailing or tourism. If, for example, a New Yorker vacations
in Montana, income is transferred from New York, where it
was earned, to Montana, where it was spent. However, on
the whole, there is no net national economic benefit beyond
the fact that the New Yorker (presumably) received a greater
benefit from the vacation than it cost Montanans to offer it.
However, if a bank in New York purchases gold mined in
Montana and sells it to a buyer in London, the value of that
transaction represents a net injection of income into the
national economy. The income is distributed between
Montana to cover the costs of mining and New York for
fees to facilitate the transaction.
The RIMS model attempts to estimate the impact of
these net injections on final demand in individual states
without regard to whether that change in demand is local or
national. In the case of gold production, almost 100 percent
of the economic impact is local and, using 1999 as a guide,
over 88 percent is an injection at a national level, reducing
the U.S. trade deficit by approximately $2.7 billion in 1999,
for example.
Table 1 shows gold and silver production by state in
1999, and Table 2 provides the same data for 2000. In 1999
the total value of gold and silver production was
approximately $3.4 billion. Because gold production data
on the table are generated from reports of major producing
mines in states and state agency reports from states like
Nevada and Alaska when available, it varies slightly from
data published by USGS (U.S. Geological Survey, 2001)
and Gold Fields Mineral Services (GFMS; Klapwijk and
others, 2000). USGS and GFMS estimates for 1999 were
340 tonnes and 341.9 tonnes respectively. The “other”
category for gold production is calculated to make the total
equal to GFMS’s estimates. The “other” category for silver
production is calculated to make the total equal USGS’s
estimate. Discrepancies in estimates are fairly minor, and
estimates for gold, in particular, probably underestimate
production significantly because of unreported placer
production by recreational as well as commercial
producers. The GFMS estimates primarily track shipments
to refiners and thus miss dust and nugget production used
for jewelry, hoarding, and other purposes. Placer and
underground mines in Alaska and the old Mother Lode
district in the central Sierra Nevada of California, which
produce gold nuggets and “specimen” gold, some of which
is used in the jewelry industry, are frequently not counted
in production data. “Specimen” gold is also prized by
mineral collectors and museums.
The more significant errors in estimating production,
however, occur for individual states. Where the industry is11
more important to the local economy, as in Nevada and
Alaska, state agencies track production closely because of
tax and other implications. In states where the industry is
less economically important, however, there is less certainty
about production figures. For example, we doubt that there
was no gold production in Arizona as indicated by Table 1.
Although there is no primary gold production in Arizona
there has been by-product production from the state’s copper
mines. These production figures, however, are not readily
accessible.
The economic impacts of the production shown on
Table 1 are represented on Table 4. These impacts are
estimated using the RIMS multipliers noted above. The
RIMS system provides final demand multipliers that indicate
direct plus indirect impacts of production in a particular
industry in each state. The multiplier for employment shown
on the table for Alaska, for example, indicates that there are
13.9 jobs in the mining industry and other industries, e.g.,
suppliers, and in the local economy (retail establishments,
etc.) for every million dollars of output in the mining industry
exported out of the local economy. As noted above, virtually
100 percent of gold and silver production is exported out of
producing states.
Similarly, RIMS provides multipliers for state output
and household earnings. These multipliers indicate dollar
changes in Gross State Product and household earnings per
million dollars of output in the industry exported out of the
state. Changes in Gross State Product reflect increases in
the incomes of other businesses in the state as a result of
mining activity. This would include the incomes of suppliers
of materials used in mining and other local businesses
providing goods and services to mining employees. Finally,
the household earnings multipliers indicate the fraction of
the value of output that ends up as income of households in
the state in all industries, not just mining employees.
Differences between various state multipliers reflect
differences in economic development and diversification in
their respective economies. Hence, Alaska, with a relatively
undeveloped economy, lacks suppliers and infrastructure to
support the industry that would hold more of the income
generated by the industry in the state. These interstate
differences, however, also point out one of the shortcomings
of the RIMS system. Note, for example, that Colorado’s
employment multiplier is 36.2. While undoubtedly an accurate
estimate on its own, it is likely inflated by the presence of
numerous mining company headquarters in the Denver area.
Hence, Colorado’s multiplier reflects jobs created by mining
in other states rather than just Colorado mining.
A second shortcoming of the multiplier analysis stems
from the fact that the multipliers are based on a study that is
almost a decade old and reflect the level of economic
development and diversification in the local economies in
the decade before the RIMS study was conducted. Following
Adam Smith’s famous dictum, “the division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market” (Smith, 1776, p. 17),
precious metals production in the 1970s and 1980s was not
sufficient to allow specialization and division of labor to
occur. As the industry grew larger and matured in the 1990s,
however, the local economy developed an infrastructure to
support the industry.
In Nevada’s case, the scale of the industry has attracted
numerous suppliers and manufacturers of a wide variety of
industrial products, specialty chemicals, etc., that allow the
local economy to serve the mining industry. This implies
that businesses in the state are now capable of supplying
much more of the needs of the industry which implies more
jobs, greater output and higher household incomes in the
state per dollar of mining industry output than a decade ago.
Hence, Nevada’s and Alaska’s multipliers probably
understate the true economic impacts of the industry.
Alaska 13.9 3,234 1.7724 412,325 0.5103 118,714
California 18.5 2,257 2.0508 250,174 0.5646 68,875
Colorado 36.2 2,450 2.6351 178,309 0.6961 47,103
Idaho 22.1 1,743 1.8165 143,281 0.5305 41,845
Montana 25.2 1,460 2.0217 117,109 0.5844 33,852
Nevada 19.0 46,529 1.7843 4,369,582 0.5484 1,342,980
S. Dakota 25.5 1,189 1.8352 85,575 0.5768 26,896
Utah 32.8 6,858 2.6325 550,390 0.7782 162,702
Washington 22.2 570 1.8854 48,408 0.5574 14,311
Other 20.2 519 1.8660 47,910 0.5646 14,496
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Total ￿ 66,807 ￿ 6,203,063 ￿ 1,871,774
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Implied Multipliers 19.65 ￿ 1.8660 ￿ 0.5646
Table 5.  Economic impacts of 2000 gold and silver production
Jobs Jobs Output Output Earnings Earnings
Multiplier Multiplier ($1,000s) Multiplier ($1,000s)12
Finally, the “implied multipliers” shown on the table
represent the weighted average multipliers for all states with
identifiable production and are used for calculating the
economic impacts of “other” production.
Tables 1 and 2 show gold and silver production in 10
states where primary gold production occurs. The exceptions
are Arizona and Utah, where gold and silver are produced
as by-products of copper mining. Due to both lower prices
($279 per ounce in 1999 and 2000 vs. $331 in 1997) and
gold production (11.3 million ounces in 1997) the total value
of production has declined by over $600 million from $4.02
billion reported in the previous edition of this report, to $3.39
billion in 1999 and $3.29 billion in 2000. In comparison to
1997 the major differences shown on Tables 3 and 4 is the
concentration of production noted above. Nevada production
increased from 7.85 million ounces in 1997 to 8.26 million
ounces in 1999 and 8.58 million ounces in 2000. Nevada
gold production in 2001 declined slightly to 8.13 million
ounces. Meanwhile, production in all other states except
Colorado has declined if only slightly.
The 2000 production and economic impact estimates
shown in Tables 2 and 5, respectively, illustrate the slight
increase in industry concentration noted above, with slightly
higher percentages of production coming from Nevada,
Alaska, and Utah.
Alaskan production has declined slightly since 1997
from 591,000 ounces to 546,000 in 2000. Unlike other states
plagued with mine closures, however, Alaska’s industry has
considerable reserves at Kinross Gold’s Fort Knox and True
North deposits outside of Fairbanks and significant placer
reserves. In addition, like Nevada, Alaska continues to attract
exploration interest despite the general reduction in
exploration spending in the U.S.
Reported California production has declined from
776,000 ounces of gold in 1997 to 447,000 in 2000. Aside
from the placer and underground mining in the Mother Lode
district noted above, most California production comes from
the desert southeastern area of the state. Since 1997, Glamis
Gold has ceased mining at its Picacho Mine although it
continues to operate its relatively nearby Rand Mine. The
largest producer is Newmont’s Mesquite Mine although it
has announced that it ceased mining in 2001. Similarly, the
Castle Mountain Mine across the state line from Las Vegas,
Nevada operated by Viceroy Gold and MK Gold has also
announced that they ceased mining in 2001. Canyon
Resources continues to operate the Briggs Mine in
approximately the same area but, in general, California has
a relatively small reserve base at current prices and
production is expected to continue to decline.
As the tables indicate, Idaho is primarily a silver-
producing state with its last primary gold-producing mine,
Meridian Gold’s Beartrack Mine, having closed in 2000.
Several of Idaho’s large silver mines have also closed or
have announced closing is imminent:  Sunshine Mining’s
Sunshine Mine, Hecla Mining’s Lucky Friday Mine, etc.
Consequently, Idaho’s reserve base has shrunk considerably
since 1997, and future production is expected to continue to
decline without significant silver price increases.
Montana is another state where production has
declined significantly since 1997 and where mining has
attracted considerable controversy over the past few years.
Montana gold production was 321,000 ounces in 1997 vs.
212,000 in 2000. Over the past four years Montana has gone
from having five major operating mines and several
reasonable prospects to having one operating mine and
numerous reclamation projects, as well as lawsuits over
denials of operating permits and related matters. The
principal controversy surrounds a 1998 voter initiative that
has banned open-pit mining and the use of cyanide for
mineral processing in the state. The mining initiative was
passed after another initiative banning corporate spending
on ballot measures had passed so that mining interests were
unable to campaign against the anti-cyanide initiative. The
anti-corporate spending initiative was subsequently ruled
unconstitutional, and the anti-cyanide initiative has been
legally challenged.
While the outcome of these legal battles remains
uncertain, the future of gold and silver mining in Montana
can be predicted with relative certainty, at least in the short
term. The state’s last major producer, Placer Dome’s Golden
Sunlight Mine near Whitehall, announced that it would close
earlier than previously anticipated when its operating permit
was legally challenged and required to partially backfill its
pit. More recently, Placer Dome has announced that it would
close the mine even sooner because of rising power costs.
At this time Golden Sunlight continues to mine, producing
over 195,000 ounces in 2001, but its future is limited by
market conditions and legal and regulatory issues. Hence,
the future prospects for gold and silver mining in Montana
are very dim, which is somewhat ironic for a state whose
motto is “Oro y Plata.”
It should be noted, however, that while the open-pit/
cyanide processing ban makes future gold and silver mining
in Montana unlikely, it does not foreclose it entirely. The
ban forecloses use of particular mining and processing
technologies that are not suitable for all deposits. So, for
example, it may be possible to conduct underground mining
and concentrate ores for processing out of state or for
processing in state with different processes. There is no
question, however, that the ban will render many orebodies
uneconomic using currently best available technologies. The
open-pit/cyanide processing ban also creates a significant
disincentive to explore in Montana, so even if mining in the
state is still technically possible, it is not likely to happen
anytime soon.
South Dakota offers a similar, although less
contentious, story. Homestake Mining’s Homestake Mine
in Lead has ceased mining. Opened in 1876, Homestake
was the longest continuously operating gold mine in the
U.S., having only been closed during wartime. As a13
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consequence, South Dakota’s production has fallen from
500,200 ounces in 1997 to 170,000 in 2000, and is expected
to continue to decline. The facilities at the site may be
converted to an underground neutrino-detection laboratory,
however, offering the community a sustainable use for the
industry’s invested capital.
Finally, and as indicated, Nevada mines continue to
account for the bulk of U.S. production. However, its mines
have not been spared the kinds of operating problems
described above. In 1997 there were 35 major and medium
sized precious metals mines operating in the state. By mid
2001, 16 of these had either closed or announced that closure
was imminent in the next 12 to 18 months. Increased
production since 1997 has come from expansion of output
at the major mines and mining complexes described above.
Consequently, the mines have continued to have a very
significant economic impact in the state in spite of the
generally depressed conditions in the industry, but the
performance has been spotty.
The most significant impact on Nevada’s economy
has been the significant reductions in exploration
expenditures and the virtual cessation of capital expenditures
on mine development and expansion. Hence, while the
economic impacts of production continue only slightly
diminished, the impacts of the loss of capital spending have
had a negative impact on the economy particularly compared
to the 1995–96 period when the industry spent approximately
one-half billion dollars per year on major mine development
and expansion projects. As an indicator of the dearth of
capital spending only two new mines have opened in Nevada
since 1997: the Franco-Nevada and Euro-Nevada joint
venture Ken Snyder Mine at Midas and Alta Gold’s
Olinghouse Mine near Fernley in the western part of the
state. The latter closed relatively soon after opening when
Alta Gold sought bankruptcy protection. The reduction in
capital spending not only resulted in a loss of construction
and service jobs in the state but also reduced sales and use
taxes paid directly by mining companies by about 30 percent.
The previous study noted the strong correlation between
commodity prices and production costs that is achieved by
producers increasing the grade of materials processed. This
occurs in aggregate when higher-cost producers processing
lower-grade ores close down, thereby raising the average
grade in the industry, and at individual operations where
lower grade ores are bypassed or stockpiled. Whether viewed
in aggregate or from the perspective of an individual
operation, the result is a relatively close tracking of
production costs and price and a relatively stable gross
operating margin in spite of price variations.
Figure 3 illustrates this aggregate phenomenon
showing gold prices, U.S. industry weighted average total
cash costs and their difference (gross operating margins) from
1989 to 2000. In this case, total cash costs refer to direct
production expenses for extraction, processing, and mine site
administration as well as direct production and property taxes
and production royalties. While direct production expenses
for extraction, processing and on-site administration
represent the actual cost of production, the latter cash
expenses for taxes and royalties are legal obligations that
must be paid to operate. Consequently, the difference between
the commodity price and total cash costs, the gross operating
margin, represents cash flows from operations.
While obviously related to profitability, gross
operating margins or cash flows ignore noncash costs such
as depreciation and depletion. These noncash items reflect
the costs of recouping operators’ investments. In addition,
gross operating margins do not consider the costs of
acquiring operators’ most valuable asset—their orebodies—
through exploration or acquisition. Consequently, rather than
reflecting profitability, the gross operating margin reflects
the ability of the operator to survive in the current price and
regulatory environment with their current orebodies. Indeed,
“total cash costs” are what conventional economics
textbooks refer to as “average variable costs” and are used
to define a firm’s shutdown point. That is, when price is
less than average variable costs, a producer will minimize
its losses by shutting down. In this context, shutting down
is suggested when gross operating margins are negative and
there are no feasible means of reducing costs.
This conventional microeconomic analysis has to be
modified somewhat to reflect the costs of closure, primarily
reclamation costs and other possible obligations incurred in
permitting and bonding processes. The prospect of facing
sometimes large reclamation costs at a point in the mine’s
life when it is generating no, or significantly diminished,
revenue, creates an economic incentive for operators to
conduct “concurrent reclamation” activities. By reclaiming
as much as possible while the mine is operating, the operator
can reduce its tax liabilities and avoid some costs triggered
by closure.
Viewed in the context of a single operation these closure
costs should not influence a closure decision. Continuing
operations would only increase losses. However, viewed in
the context of an operator with multiple operations which
increased industry concentration has led to, these closure costs
can influence decision making at the margin. The marginal
operation can be viewed as an option on future production
that has value because prices could increase. Closing a
marginal operation diminishes the option value because of
the costs that would have to be incurred to reopen it.14
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Figure 3.  Average annual prices, total cash production costs, and
gross margin, 1989–2000.
Figure 3 shows U.S. industry gross operating margins
fluctuating between a high of approximately $150 per ounce
in 1989, 1990, 1994, and 1996 and a low of $88 in 1992.
Since 1997 when gold prices dropped through the $300 level
at year-end, gross operating margins have slowly eroded from
$112 per ounce in 1997 to $101 in the most recent period.
While this trend is clearly disturbing from the perspective
of industry sustainability, it should be noted that these
margins were obtained by bringing total cash costs down by
one third, from $256 per ounce in 1995 to $172 in 1999 and
$178 in 2000. Hence, the industry has demonstrated
remarkable resiliency in the face of considerable adversity.
One reasonable question concerning the trends
illustrated by Figure 3 is why producers do not always
produce at lower costs if they are capable?  The implication
of the question is that producers are incurring unnecessary
costs in periods of higher prices. While there have certainly
been examples of unwise expenditures in the industry or, to
put it differently, expenditures that have not increased
shareholder value—and the author could easily compile a
list of such things done by mining company executives with
the benefit of hindsight-the point is that the trend illustrated
by Figure 3 is the result of good management, not bad. These
cost savings have come from numerous sources, as indicated
above. At the aggregate, industry-wide level, closure of
higher-cost producers has brought the average down. But,
more significantly, cost cutting at individual properties has
resulted in substantial cost savings. One natural source of
cost reduction that results from price changes, in this case,
reductions, is the adjustment of producer cut-off grades. A
second source of sometimes significant cost savings comes
from delayed spending on development and exploration.
In the case of adjusting cut-off grades operators are
making an explicit marginal revenue versus marginal cost
calculation. That is, operators are likely to have materials in
their orebodies that vary both in grade and geochemical
nature. Grade variations refer to the quantity of recoverable
gold and/or silver per ton of ore. The average grade for all of
the material planned to be mined over the life of the mine
varies significantly among mines from under 0.02 ounces
per ton to over one ounce per ton or fifty times richer ore.
Likewise, the grade of materials available at an individual
operation may vary from containing several ounces of gold
per ton of ore to barren material. In determining a cut-off
grade the operator determines what grade of ore breaks even
at the margin or what grade generates just enough revenue
to cover the cost of its production. Having determined the
cut-off grade, the operator classifies all higher-grade
materials as ore and lower grades as waste. In some cases an
operator may have two cut-off grades, one for material that
can be processed immediately and another for material to be
stockpiled for processing later if market conditions warrant.15
Figure 4.  Total cash production costs in 1999 and 2000.
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As a consequence of this practice, changes in prices
naturally lead to adjustments of cut-off grades. Lower prices
raise cut-off grades and imply that higher-grade materials
will be processed. This, in turn, lowers costs. Price increases
have the opposite effect, lowering cut-off grades and raising
production costs. These adjustments, which all operators
make if they are able, produce the correlation between price
and production costs illustrated by Figure 3.
Another factor that contributes to the relationship
between price and production costs, albeit in a less consistent
way than cut-off grade adjustments, is adjustments in the
timing of exploration and development expenditures.
Exploration and development expenditures are frequently
associated with finding a new orebody and developing a
new mine to extract and process the ore. However,
exploration and development are activities that virtually all
mine operators conduct throughout most of the operating
lives of their mines. Exploration activities near an existing
mine seek to expand reserves and extent the operating life
of the mine. Development activities can consist of removing
overburden to get access to ore that will be mined in the
future. Operators frequently drill exploration holes to
determine the existence of mineralization in areas around
known orebodies but stop short of drilling enough holes to
prove a reserve, that is, prove that there is a 95 percent
probability that ore can be mined at a profit.
When exploration and development occurs prior to
production they are capitalized and become part of a mine’s
noncash costs. However, after a mine begins production
these expenses become a use of cash flow that cuts into
the gross operating margin of the mine. Even if accountants
choose to capitalize these costs rather than expense them
against current production and, thereby, lower their
reported current total cash costs, these activities are a use
of cash and subject to the same sort of marginal revenue
versus marginal cost calculation employed in calculating
cut-off grades.
Exploring for ore and developing orebodies that will
not be mined until later not only have explicit, out of pocket,
costs, but implicit costs including the cost of capital and
the time value of money. Hence, reserves that may not be
mined for several years have a lower net present discounted
value than similar quality reserves that will be mined sooner.
The operator must evaluate the expected gross operating
margin on mining reserves in the future, and discount these
net expected net margins to their present value. These
discounted future gains must be compared with the cost of
exploration drilling today to prove they exist. As prices
decline, the net present value of proving reserves to be
mined in the future decline.
The $6-per-ounce increase in total cash costs in 2000
shown in Figure 3 might suggest that the industry has wrung16
about all it can from its costs and that the downward trend
in production costs that began in 1997 may be reversed. As
indicated by Figure 4, this conclusion is unwarranted. Figure
4 shows 1999 and 2000 total cash costs for individual mines
and mining complexes. Each horizontal segment of the total
cash cost curves represents the output of one mine or
complex arranged, left to right, from the lowest to highest
cost producers. The length of the segment represents the
output of that mine or complex measured in millions of
ounces on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis indicates
total cash production costs for that mine or complex and the
vertical distance between the curve and the “1999 and 2000
Average Price - $279” line indicates the gross operating
margin or cash flow from operations.
A comparison of the curves for 1999 and 2000
provides better insight into the cause of the $6-per-ounce
increase and likely trends in production costs. Note that at
the low-cost (left) end of the curves, the 1999 curve lies
significantly below the 2000 curve up until about just over
three million ounces. From that point until approximately
five million ounces, the two curves are very close to each
other. To the right of five million ounces on the horizontal
axis, the 1999 curve lies above the 2000 curve and
substantially more so on the far right of the figure.
This shift in the position of the curve is the result of
several factors. First, at the low cost (left) end of the curves,
several mines with extremely low costs saw their costs rise
in 2000. These cost increases were actually fairly large in
percentage terms, e.g., at the lowest cost producing mine in
both years, Placer Dome and Kennecott’s Cortez property
in Nevada, total cash costs increased 25 percent, from $48
to $60 per ounce. Several other producers at this end of the
curve also experienced relatively large increases in costs in
percentage terms but, again, these percentage increases are
calculated on very low initial costs. While these large relative
cost increases on approximately one third of U.S. production
increased the weighted average for the industry, they
certainly do not suggest a threat to the industry’s
sustainability because they remain some of the most efficient
mines in the world.
At the high cost (right) end of the curve there are some
other significant differences between the 1999 and 2000
curves. Most notably, the lower 2000 curve indicates lower
costs and the longer curve indicates greater output. The lower
costs came about for several reasons; however, the most
significant change came from the closure of one very high
cost mine, Placer Dome’s Getchell Mine in Nevada. Other
mines were able to cut costs to lower the curve but,
unfortunately, in several cases these cost savings were
associated with decisions to close the mines, which implied
that certain costs of ongoing operations were no longer
necessary. As a result of these changes, it is likely that the
2001 curve will be even lower and average total cash
production costs will come back down in 2001, particularly if
increases in electricity costs are a temporary phenomenon.
The key point with respect to the shift in the curve between
1999 and 2000 is that rationalization of production has reduced
production generating negative cash flows from around 10
percent of production to about one percent of production.
While total cash costs are an important indicator of
profitability, because the difference between realized price
and total cash costs represents cash flow from operations or
gross operating margins, they do not reflect the ability of
operators to recoup their initial investment as well as cover
other costs necessary to sustain operations over the long
run. The latter costs would include exploration to replace
reserves and corporate overhead costs. Total production costs
shown on Figure 5 for 1999 and 2000 are better indicators
of profitability, although they also do not generally include
the latter kind of costs noted above. Total production costs
include total cash costs and noncash costs such as
depreciation of plant and equipment used in production and
certain on-site development costs.
Because total cash costs are the largest component of
total costs, the relationship between 1999 and 2000 total
production costs is very similar to that described above for
total cash costs. At the low (left) end of the curves 1999
costs were lower, with the crossover point around 3 million
ounces. From the crossover point to approximately 7 million
ounces, total production costs in the two years were
approximately the same. As with Figure 4, the most
significant differences between production costs is at the
high cost (right) end of the curves with 2000 total costs
substantially below 1999. Between the two years an
additional million ounces were rationalized on a total cost
basis with approximately seven million ounces and eight
million ounces produced at a cost below the average price
in 1999 and 2000 respectively.
Figures 6 and 7 present similar information for 1999
and 2000, respectively, showing total cash costs and total
production costs in 1999 in Figure 6 and 2000 data in Figure
7. The difference between the two curves on each figure
represents noncash production costs as noted above. Note,
however, that because of different noncash costs between
different mines, costs for particular mines only line up on
the horizontal axis for the lowest and highest cost mines.17
Figure 5.  Average total production costs in 1999 and 2000.
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Figure 6.  Average total cash costs and average total production costs in 1999.
1999 Average Gold Price: $279/oz
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Figure 7.  Average total cash production costs and average total production costs in 2000.
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
In general, the U.S. gold industry has some of the most
efficient mines in the world as measured by production costs.
Were gold and silver mining simply a matter of extracting
and processing ore, there would be little concern about the
sustainability of the industry beyond the normal concern of
exhausting individual orebodies. And, indeed, the exhaustion
of individual orebodies has not historically been a threat to
industry sustainability because the industry has had an
outstanding record of replacing mined gold and silver with
new reserves through exploration.
At the present time, questions concerning industry
sustainability are much more closely linked to the regulatory
environment than to issues of engineering and geology. Two
significant public policy and regulatory issues facing the
industry are the “3809” reform process and the U.S.
Department of the Interior (USDI) Solicitor’s “Millsite”
opinion issued in 1997. The first issue refers to the rewriting
of Surface Management regulations authorized by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)
found in 43 C.F.R. § 3809 in the last years of the Clinton
administration. The so-called “millsite” opinion refers to
an opinion issued by the USDI Solicitor John Leshy that
limits operators on federally owned lands managed by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to one 5-acre millsite
claim per one 20-acre mining claim. Both of these issues
illustrate the fairly open hostility toward the industry that
developed during the latter half of the tenure of Bruce Babbitt
as Secretary of the Interior.
At this point, as a result of the change in
administration, some of the provisions most objectionable
to the industry have been dropped or held for
reconsideration. However, the general objectives of the
advocates of public land law and regulatory reform have
not changed, and these issues are likely to resurface in a
future administration. The issues are highly divisive, indeed,
as divisive as the 2000 election itself. Further, it should be
noted that parts of the reform package were warranted, like
financial guarantees for reclamation, and in the best interests
of a sustainable industry even if some in the industry
objected to them.19
The “3809” rule-making has significant implications
for the industry because the new regulations include
procedural and substantive changes that will, according to
the BLM’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), impose
substantial economic losses on the industry and the
communities dependent on it. These losses, according to
the BLM’s EIS, will include an estimated 3,200 jobs,
reductions in industrial output of between $180 and $540
million per year, and reductions in household income
between $89 and $249 million per year (BLM, 1999a).
To estimate these losses, the BLM has apparently
assumed a pro rata reduction in mining activity on federal
lands affected by the regulations. This type of estimate,
however, arguably errs in two ways. First, it probably
overstates the initial impact of the regulations, and second,
it probably significantly understates the long-run impacts.
The initial impacts are likely overstated because, as
noted above, most U.S. production is coming from large,
long-lived properties that are already permitted. These
operations are not likely to be affected—at least initially—
by the regulations although they may be affected in the future
if they seek to modify their operating permits for expansions
or other changes. We will undoubtedly see some current
operations close in the near term, but this is the result of low
prices, high operating costs, and exhaustion of orebodies. It
is unlikely that many of those mines that close in the next
year or so, or have closed in the past couple of years, would
do so or would have done so if the price of gold were $400
per ounce and the price of silver were $8 per ounce.
As noted, the most significant impacts of the new
regulations will occur in the long run. These impacts will
occur when current viable operations seek to modify their
operating permits to allow them to expand or modify
operations. In addition, and perhaps most significantly, the
new regulations could create significant disincentives to
explore for new orebodies on federal lands. The potential
impacts on future exploration are perhaps best illustrated
by the denial of an operating permit for Glamis Gold’s
Imperial project in southeastern California. This case is
currently being litigated as other projects undoubtedly will
be in the future. This case is discussed briefly below, but at
this point suffice it to say that revised regulations grant the
BLM broad authority to deny operating permits based on
purely subjective grounds unrelated to performance
standards such as environmental quality regulations or
regulations concerning wildlife habitat, and cultural and
historical resources.
The mining industry believes that the economic losses
noted above are significant underestimates in the long run
because the primary effect will be to reduce mineral
exploration, which will mean that operators currently
producing in the U.S. will not discover new mineral deposits
to replace those currently being mined. This, in turn, will mean
that when currently producing orebodies are exhausted over
the next five to ten years, mining operations will shut down.
Despite these substantial costs, the proposed
regulations offer little in the way of environmental protection
except, and exclusively from, the BLM’s prediction that
there will be less mining if the regulations are adopted.
Moreover, the BLM’s EIS also acknowledges that current
surface management regulations already incorporate most
of the substantive environmental protection requirements
included in the revised regulations, which became effective
January 20, 2001.
There are several controversial issues inherent in
the 3809 rule-making that arise from both procedural and
substantive issues. For example, a significant substantive
issue concerned regulation of water quality and quantity
or, the allocation of water for various uses. However, it is
on the reform process itself where controversy was most
evident because, the industry argued, the BLM lacked a
clear Congressional mandate for its revision of the 3809
rules. Indeed, it was argued that the BLM acted in spite of
Congress.
On the procedural side of the controversy, the late
1980s and early 1990s saw several attempts in Congress to
amend the 1872 Mining Law. The proposed changes
included imposition of a leasing system, a federal royalty,
and other fiscal initiatives. Also proposed was greater federal
authority to restrict access to public lands, managed by the
BLM and the U.S. Forest Service, for exploration and mining
operations. Although the industry supported some limited
types of reforms, the reforms proposed by environmental
interest groups sought to significantly limit mineral industry
access to public lands, and these reforms were opposed by
the industry. These reform efforts generally ended in failure
although Congress did make small changes such as imposing
a moratorium on patents, i.e., selling surface rights to mine
operators for $2.50 per acre, and replacing the annual $100
per claim assessment work requirement with a $100 per year
holding fee.
Reform of the 1872 Mining Law was viewed by
environmental interest groups as essential for limiting mineral
development on public lands because FLPMA did not give
BLM authority to limit mining. FLPMA directed the Secretary
“by regulations or otherwise, [to] take any action necessary
to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the public
lands.” (FLPMA § 302(b), emphasis added) This phrase
became the primary legal authority for BLM’s regulation of
mining, but it only allowed BLM to restrict degradation of
public lands that were unnecessary to mining. Disturbances
on the public lands that were necessary to mining were beyond
the BLM’s regulatory authority. The same section FLPMA
stated:
“... no provision of this section, or any other section of this
Act shall in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or
impair the rights of any locators or claims under that Act,
including, but not limited to, rights of ingress and egress.”
(FLPMA § 302(b))20
1 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-31, § 3002, 113 Stat. 57 (1999).
2 Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 357, 113 Stat. 1501 (Nov. 29, 1999).
3 Memorandum from Department of Interior Solicitor’s Office to BLM (Dec. 8, 1999).
4 Pub. L. No. 106-291, § 156, 114 Stat. 1011 (2000) (emphasis added).
It should be noted, however, that disturbances of the
public lands that were necessary to mining were still
regulated by all applicable environmental regulations
promulgated under the Clean Water, Clean Air, Antiquities,
and other Acts. This is not to suggest that the industry has a
spotless environmental record. Some operators have
damaged water resources in violation of these laws and
regulations. However, these incidents provide an argument
for better implementation and enforcement of existing
regulations, not the elimination of mining on federal lands.
Moreover, since mining operators are subject to state
reclamation laws and need approved reclamation plans
before creating a disturbance, it is unlikely that they would
cause unnecessary or undue degradation of the public lands
since this, if it had any practical consequences, would likely
increase their reclamation costs.
In any event, as hopes of Congressional reform of
the mining laws faded with changes in Congressional
leadership, Secretary of the Interior Babbitt directed the
BLM to resume revising the 3809 surface management
regulations. In his directive he stated:
“It is plainly no longer in the public interest to wait for
Congress to enact legislation that corrects the remaining
shortcomings of the 3809 regulations.” (Babbitt, 1997)
Hence, the BLM sought to impose rules through the
regulatory process that Congress expressly refused to enact.
What followed the Secretary’s 1997 directive has been
controversial both within the federal government and
between the federal government and affected states. Within
the federal government, and indicative of the BLM’s lack
of a Congressional mandate, Congress subsequently
addressed the 3809 rule-making process on five separate
occasions. Congress directed the BLM to perform certain
tasks before the rules could be adopted. Among these tasks
were to conduct a study considering specific issues. Congress
also attempted to limit revisions of existing 3809 rules. All
of these Congressional directives can reasonably be
interpreted an as attempt to “rein in” the agency.
Among the tasks BLM was required to perform before
issuing its final 3809 regulations was the commissioning of
a study by the National Research Council (NRC). The NRC
formed a Committee on Hard Rock Mining on Federal lands
in late 1998 comprised of thirteen members with diverse
backgrounds and areas of expertise. The Committee held
hearings seeking input from the mining industry, state
officials, environmental groups and the public at large. In
addition, members of the Committee conducted field
inspections of mining and exploration operations permitted
under the existing regulations. The Committee reviewed
hundreds of documents to produce a peer-reviewed study
published in September of 1999 entitled Hardrock Mining
on Federal Lands (National Research Council, 1999). The
general findings of the report included:
“Existing regulations are generally well coordinated,
although some changes are necessary. The overall
structure of the federal and state laws and regulations that
provide mining-related environmental protection is
complicated but generally effective.”
“Improvements in the implementation of existing regulations
present the greatest opportunity for improving
environmental protection and the efficiency of the regulatory
process.” (p. 5–6)
Following the release of the report the BLM was
prepared to issue the final regulations without apparent
regard for the findings of the report and in spite of requests
to extend the comment period in light of the NRC findings.
Congress overruled the BLM’s refusal to extend the
comment period in an emergency supplemental
appropriations bill adopted in May, 1999.1
The following November Congress weighed in again,
restricting changes in the 3809 regulations to rules that were
“not inconsistent with the recommendations contained in
the National Research Council report ...” 2  In response,
Interior Department Solicitor sent a directive to the BLM
instructing it to only consider portions of the NRC report
that were plainly labeled as “recommendations.”  In addition,
the Solicitor indicated that “rules addressing issues that are
not directly covered by the NRC’s recommendations would
not run afoul of this [Congressional] limitation.” 3  In other
words, in the Solicitor’s view, the Congressional limitation
did not limit anything unless it contradicted something
plainly labeled as a “recommendation” in the NRC report.
Because the final 3809 regulations had not been
issued before the Congressional limitation expired, Congress
had to weigh in again. In the Interior Department
Appropriations Act for FY 2001 the Conference report
attempted to made Congressional intent clear:
“Section 156 allows the BLM to promulgate new hardrock
mining regulations that are not inconsistent with the National
Research Council Report entitled “Hardrock Mining on
Federal Lands.”  This provision reinstates a requirement
that was included in Public Law 106-113... The statutory
requirement was based on a consensus reached among
Committee Members and the Administration. On December
8, 1999, the Interior Solicitor wrote an opinion concluding
that this requirement applies only to a few lines of the Report,
and that it imposes no significant restrictions on the Bureau’s
rulemaking authority. The Committee does not agree with
the solicitor’s opinion, and does not intend the language in
this section to constitute any ratification of or agreement
with that opinion.” 421
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The general presumption is that federal agencies
promulgate regulations to implement Congressional intent.
Indeed, implementing Congressional intent is the source of
an agency’s authority to issue regulations. However, in this
case, it is difficult to divine Congressional intent from the
actions of the BLM. On the contrary, as noted above, the
DOI and BLM appear to have acted in spite of Congress.
Somewhat ironically, on August 4, 1999, as this
process was going on, President Clinton signed Executive
Order 13132, which requires a federal agency issuing
regulations to consult with state governments and report on
the nature of that collaboration and report what it has done
to accommodate state concerns to the Office of Management
and Budget. As a consequence, it is also useful background
to look at federal-state interactions concerning the rewriting
of the 3809 regulations.
Western public lands states, acting individually and
collectively through the Western Governors’ Association
(WGA), repeatedly sought to influence the BLM. Because
of Nevada’s leading position in the industry, the State
consistently questioned the need for the new regulations.
The State referred to the BLM’s own assessment in its Draft
EIS that Nevada’s regulatory requirements effectively
protected the environment, that cooperation between the
BLM and Nevada’s regulatory agencies was good, and that
mining in Nevada was carefully regulated.
In June 1997 the WGA adopted a resolution stating:
“[r]evisions to the 3809 regulations may not be necessary.
More consideration should be given to compliance with
existing regulations. States have filled and should continue
to fill any deficiencies identified in the statutory and
regulatory framework and its enforcement. Establishing
burdensome or duplicative new BLM regulatory
requirements for mining is not in the best interest of states
or the nation.” 5
In addition to this resolution, the Governors asked
the BLM to consult with them individually and collectively
regarding the 3809 rule-making. Apparently before the BLM
could respond to this request, in the fall of 1997 Congress
adopted language in the FY 1998 Interior appropriations
bill prohibiting the BLM from conducting any further work
on the revisions of the 3809 regulations until it had certified
that it had consulted with every governor and/or his or her
representatives in states with public lands open to mineral
entry.6  Three days after the appropriations bill was passed,
and without any apparent further contact between the BLM
and the western governors individually or collectively, the
BLM Director sent letters to the Chairmen of the appropriate
Congressional Committees certifying that the required
consultation had been done.7  The WGA later disputed this
claim, stating in a letter several months later that “we feel
that consultation has yet to truly begin.” 8
As the rule making process proceeded, western state
governors continued to interject themselves individually and
through the WGA. Commenting on one of BLM’s “working
drafts” of the regulations, the WGA restated western states’
concerns with the proposed changes:
“[W]e remain concerned that BLM has still not made a
compelling case for the need to rewrite the existing
regulations. We believe that the current system is working
well. ... To garner state support for the proposed changes
to its 3809 regulations, it is incumbent upon BLM to
demonstrate that there is a problem that needs fixing.” 9
And, later, in a request that BLM extend its public
comment period until after the NRC Report could be
published, Wyoming Governor Jim Geringer, on behalf of
the WGA, stated:
“From the very beginning of the rule-making process that
you initiated two years ago, the governors of the Western
Governors’ Association, collectively and individually, have
repeatedly requested an explanation of why the BLM
believes that mining on public lands is not proper under
the current 3809 regulations. Let me put it in simple terms:
What’s broken?” 10
In Senate hearings in the spring of 1998, Nevada
Governor Bob Miller again stated Nevada’s position, which
concurred with the findings of the BLM’s Draft EIS, that
the current system worked well in protecting the
environment and that Nevada’s regulatory framework was
more than adequate. It was at this point that Governor Miller
recommended that Congress require BLM to seek an
independent evaluation of the existing 3809 regulations,
which eventually led to the NRC report.11
What is clear from these attempts of western
governors is that they had little or no impact on the BLM,
which was determined to revise the 3809 regulations. The
BLM apparently viewed its public comment periods, during
which states were allowed to submit comments along with
members of the public, as seeking consultation with the
states. The states, on the other hand, apparently sought more
deference: the deference of a sovereign-to-sovereign
consultation. This never occurred nor, it should be added,
does it appear to be required under the National22
12 Turnipseed, R.M., 2000, Director, Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, memorandum to Governor Guinn (November 28, 2000).
13 43 C.F.R. § 3809.2-2 (1999).
14 65 Federal Register at 70017.
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which created the
process requiring federal agencies to present a DEIS to the
public for comment. The western states did, however,
manage to influence the process through their Congressional
delegations, which intervened on their behalf to commission
the NRC Report and forced the agency to extend its deadlines
for public comment. While influence over the process is
some impact, however, it is not clear that states or the
Congress had any meaningful impact in the substantive
issues addressed by the regulations.
On a substantive level, the original version of the
regulations would have fundamentally altered the nature of
state management of its water resources. Performance
standards for water quality and allocation, for example,
caused serious concerns in some quarters. The Director of
the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources’ assessment of the impact of the BLM’s revisions
of the 3809 regulations is that they “clearly attempt to
undermine the state’s primacy in water quality protection of
both surface and ground water, and the State Engineer’s
authority to allocate water from both surface and underground
sources.” 12  It should be noted, however, that some of these
performance standards have been eliminated, at least
temporarily, and many of these issues are yet to be resolved.
With respect to water quality requirements in the
revised regulations, the old 3809 regulations require all
operators to comply with applicable federal and state water
quality standards.13  Federal regulators, generally the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), set discharge and
other standards and the states may make these standards
more stringent based on local conditions. The proposed
regulations, on the other hand, would have required operators
to minimize changes in water quality, (43 C.F.R. §
3809.420(b)) where minimize means to
“reduce the adverse impact of an operation to the lowest
practical level. During review of operations, BLM may
determine that it is practical to avoid or eliminate particular
impacts.” (43 C.F.R. § 3809.5)
This difference might appear minor, but it is
significant both in terms of potential costs and risks to
prospective operators and state authority to regulate water
quality. A prospective operator may propose to discharge
water that meets EPA and state water quality standards yet,
if the BLM determines it “practicable” to improve the quality
of the water discharged, the operating permit could be
denied. The costs and risks to prospective operators implicit
are fairly clear. The “practicable” means of improving water
quality are likely to increase its costs—otherwise, in all
likelihood, it would have chosen to do it voluntarily. In
addition, this provision would simply give BLM one more
reason to deny a permit. In light of the fact that a proposed
plan of operations could meet or exceed EPA pollution
standards, it would also give the BLM the right to supersede
EPA regulatory authority.
These aspects of the impacts of the proposed 3809
regulations make it clear that it will become riskier to explore
for minerals on public lands. This discretion, combined with
other features of the revised regulations, would appear to
create strong disincentives to operate on public lands.
For example, the revised regulations provided a new
definition of FLPMA’s reference to the Secretary’s obligation
to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the public
lands. Under the new definition the BLM can deny permits
to operate in a manner necessary to mining and within the
guidelines of all applicable federal and state environmental
laws if, in the opinion of the BLM, the operations unduly
degrade the environment.14  Hence, the regulations essentially
rewrote the legislation authorizing them.
Another example is what has come to be known as
the “mine veto provision.” This provision was subsequently
dropped in the revisions to 3809 regulations that became
effective on December 31, 2000. However, the mine veto
provision provides a perspective on what was proposed. The
provision also expands the definition of unnecessary or
undue degradation to include practices that “result in
substantial irreparable harm to significant scientific, cultural,
or environmental resource values of the public lands that
cannot effectively be mitigated.” (43 C.F.R. § 3809.5)  While
seeking to avoid “irreparable harm” certainly sounds like a
worthy goal, it is important to be specific about what kinds
of harms that mining can cause even if these practices violate
no existing environmental laws and regulations or laws and
regulations protecting wildlife habitat, or cultural and
historical resources. Primarily, since mining generally
involves altering the landscape, “irreparable harm” can
consist of digging a pit that is not back-filled, removing
some portion of a mountain or, more generally, failing to
return the land to its original contours through reclamation.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that “irreparable harm” could
be determined to occur by simply disturbing a site even if it
is fully reclaimed to original contours. Undoubtedly, one
could find some individual who claims that a particular place
is sacred and that its disturbance would cause “irreparable
harm” and an administration seeking to limit mining could
deny operating permits.
Lest this example seem far-fetched, and as an
indication of how this provision can be implemented, Glamis
Gold was recently denied a permit for its Imperial Project
at a site near the Arizona-California border because there
are trails on the site believed to be used by a local Native
American tribe to visit religious sites. The final EIS for the23
15 65 Fed. Reg. At 70053 (emphasis added).
project could not identify any religious sites or archeological
resources on the mining project site, nor could it confirm
that Native Americans used these trails in the past 50 years.
Nonetheless, the project was stopped by the final
environmental impact statement because the EIS claimed
that it would have disturbed these cultural resources that
are no more substantial than the “setting, feeling and
association” of the area. (BLM, 2000)
If this incident provides an example of how the
“irreparable harm” standard can be applied then it is not
difficult to see why mining companies may be hesitant to
explore for minerals in the United States. Mineral
exploration is a risky proposition in any event, and the
uncertainty of going forward with an exploration or mining
project is only made worse by this new standard.
State Concerns
A significant source of state concerns about the revised 3809
regulations stems from fears that the BLM can use these
regulations, and it stated an intent to do so, to extend federal
authority over areas of traditional state sovereignty. In the
arid western U.S., where water has always been a source of
controversy, this assertion of new federal powers is a serious
concern.
As an example of the nature of state concerns, the
water quality performance standards in the revised
regulations put the BLM in a position to overrule permits
issued by states which have primacy, or primary regulatory
oversight authority under environmental laws. Since these
regulations only relate to permits for exploration and mining
on BLM administered lands, they could be viewed as a
reasonable effort to protect water quality on BLM lands.
However, because of extensive federal land ownership and
BLM land management in western states, potential for
conflict between state and federal regulators is clear. In
Nevada, for example, which is 86 percent federally owned,
and most of which is managed by the BLM, virtually all
surface waters and aquifers flow over or are under BLM
lands in some part. Hence, this same seemingly reasonable
logic would give all water quality regulatory authority in
Nevada to the BLM.
The revised 3809 regulations also assert a federal right
to determine water use and make water allocation decisions
on federal lands that, with the exception of “reserved rights”
created by Congressional actions, have been regulated by
state law. These provisions primarily relate to mine
dewatering activities in which operators sometimes pump
large volumes of water to prevent it from seeping into open
pits and underground works. In Nevada, permits to dewater
mines are issued by the Nevada State Engineer and typically
call for reinjection of the water into the same aquifer to
recharge it some distance from the mine. In some cases the
water is used for irrigation, replacing groundwater that would
have to be pumped under prior existing state issued water
rights. When neither of these options is practicable, the State
Engineer has allowed water to be discharged into surface
streams.
These allocations of water for mine dewatering are
temporary, largely nonconsumptive, although a small
quantity of water may be used for mineral processing and
some may be lost to evaporation, and are made with respect
to prior existing rights. None of these rights, it should be
added, belong to the federal government since the land
management activities of the BLM do not constitute a
“beneficial use” under state water law. That is, the BLM
does not provide water for human consumption, grazing,
mining, or manufacturing.
The revised 3809 regulations require that an operator
“must conduct operations to minimize changes in water
quantity in preference to water supply replacement,” and
“conduct operations affecting ground water, such as
dewatering, pumping and injecting, to minimize impacts on
surface and other natural resources, such as wetlands,
riparian areas, aquatic habitat, and other features that are
dependent on ground water.” (43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(b)(2))
Moreover, in response to public comments on the BLM EIS
(BLM, 1999a) questioning BLM authority to allocate water,
BLM responded:
“While allocation and permitting of water use is primarily
the responsibility of the States, the ‘prevention of
unnecessary or undue degradation’ mandate makes it
BLM’s responsibility to address impacts to water resources
on the lands under its jurisdiction, in deciding whether to
approve plans of operations under these regulations.” 15
The proposed regulations and BLM’s asserted
authority to overrule the State Engineer, creates a de facto
water right for “wetlands, riparian areas, aquatic habitat,
and other features that are dependent on ground water.”  With
the possible exception of wetlands protection authorized by
legislation, there does not appear to be Congressional intent
that would create a “reserved right” under FLPMA. In
addition, BLM’s asserted authority under the revised 3809
regulations would a de facto federal right to determine
“beneficial use,” a right that heretofore has been the
exclusive right of the state legislatures.
The use of a “minimization” performance standard
in the context of water allocation is problematic, as it was
in the context of impacts on water quality, although for
slightly different reasons. In this case, dewatering activities
generally simply move water from one area, in the vicinity
of mining operations where it is a nuisance, to another area
where it may generate environmental benefits. For example,
discharge of mine water into the Humboldt River in
Nevada has benefited downstream users, i.e., irrigators,24
16 See, for example, Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Production Co., 436 U.S.
604, 611-14 (1978).
17 FLPMA § 701(g)(2); 43 U.S.C. 1701(g)(2).
temporarily improved downstream aquatic habitat, created
temporary wetlands, and improved biodiversity. Indeed,
the filling in of open pits after mining and dewatering
operations may create more permanent aquatic habitat and
recreational resources for the state’s citizens and tourists.
The focus on minimizing impacts “in preference to water
supply replacement” which may be purely local, misses
the bigger picture.
In granting dewatering permits the State Engineer
makes a determination that is subject to appeal by other water
rights owners, that the proposed water allocation is a
beneficial use and promotes the general welfare of the state.
These criteria are likely to be inconsistent with impact
minimization.
The State Engineer has legislative authority to
consider the general welfare of the state, a sovereign
authority. The BLM, in contrast, appears prepared to focus
on minimizing local impacts but, more significantly,
maximizing its authority to deny operating permits that the
State Engineer’s Office may approve in pursuit of its view
of the general welfare of the state.
Congress and the courts have long recognized that
water rights do not derive from federal laws.16  The
regulations also contravene the clear language of FLPMA
that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as  . . . expanding
or diminishing Federal or State jurisdiction, responsibility,
interests, or rights in water resources . . . “ 17  Indeed, the
3809 revisions appear to revive a dispute that was, until
now, put to rest in the early 1980s-that FLPMA does not
grant BLM authority over water resources. (Shurts, 1984)
The Potential Benefits of Regulatory Reform
As some of the comments from the Western Governors’
Association above should have made clear, one of the
contentious issues in the revision of the 3809 regulations
was the need for the revisions in the first place. As noted,
then-Secretary of the Interior Babbitt believed they were
necessary because Congress refused to reform the general
mining laws in a manner to his liking. Secretary Babbitt’s
views were, and are, supported by numerous environmental
interest groups. The Bush administration’s decision early
on to open up the regulations, which went into effect on
Inauguration Day, January 20, 2001, to more public
comment was harshly criticized by these groups. This
decision was later reversed in light of this criticism and then
the regulations were revised and reissued on December 31,
2001. At the time of this writing, the status of some of the
provisions of the regulations remains unclear. However,
some of the more onerous provisions from the perspective
of the industry have been removed. The so-called “mine
veto provision” based on “irreparable harm” has been
eliminated, for example, so a “wait and see” perspective is
probably most appropriate.
In light of both the controversy surrounding the
revision of the surface management regulations and the
acknowledged costs, it seems reasonable to look into the
potential benefits that regulatory reform can bring. Aside
from improving enforcement of existing regulations, the
major change in regulations recommended by the NRC study
focused on financial guarantees to assure that operators or
the BLM can reclaim lands affected by mining. Hence, it is
not argued that regulatory reform was unnecessary. The
following focuses on the “Benefit-Cost Analysis/Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act Analysis” (BLM, 1999b) conducted
pursuant to Executive Order 12866 (BLM B-C Analysis),
which is a companion document to the EIS.
In valuing the benefits of proposed regulations to
protect public lands from unnecessary and undue
degradation, the first task is to identify what the proposed
changes would accomplish if adopted. In an analysis of any
policy, program or regulation it is not sufficient to
demonstrate that a problem exists to justify government
intervention. It is necessary to identify the actual net
marginal benefits that regulatory intervention will induce,
and then compare these benefits to the costs of the
intervention. (Gramlich, 1991; Posner, 1998, p. 56)  In this
case, this implies a need to carefully specify what the
proposed changes in 3809 regulations can reasonably be
expected to produce in terms of improved environmental
protection.
This analysis proceeds from the premise that some
activities conducted on public lands that are governed by
3809 regulations can and sometimes do cause unnecessary
and undue degradation of the public lands. The issuance of
Notices of Noncompliance under part 3809 regulations since
their publication in 1980 is direct evidence of this. The
question to be addressed, however, is to what extent will
the proposed regulations prevent this degradation in the
future?  That is, what harm that is currently being done to
the environment will be prevented under the proposed rules?
The BLM B-C Analysis correctly uses estimated
environmental damages avoided by the proposed rule as a
proxy for benefits. However, after a careful examination, it
does not appear that the benefits of the proposed 3809
regulatory changes, as described in the EIS, are addressed
by the BLM B-C Analysis.
Before examining the BLM B-C Analysis, however,
it is first necessary to characterize the major regulatory
initiatives in the revised regulations that may generate
benefits for the public and the environment. Then, the BLM
B-C Analysis can be viewed from the perspective of the25
environmental benefits that the revised regulations can be
expected to produce.
The major change in surface management regulations,
as noted in the EIS (BLM, 1999a, p. 92-93) primarily relate
to “Notice Level Actions.”  These actions, under the old
3809 regulations, were actions that disturbed less than five
acres. Under the old 3809 regulations, individuals or
operators seeking to conduct operations such as mineral
exploration or extraction and processing that disturbed more
than five acres are required to file a “Plan of Operations”
which is subject to much more federal and state regulatory
oversight than Notice Level Actions. Plans of Operations,
because they require more detailed planning and oversight,
also consume more regulatory and industry resources and
require more time.
As the EIS points out (p. 92–93), the major changes
envisioned by the revised 3809 regulations would, in some
cases, require a Plan of Operations for some activities that
could be carried out under Notices of Intent under the old
regulations. In addition, the revisions would require bonding
for Notice Level operations.
With respect to Plan Level activities conducted under
the old regulations, the EIS repeatedly points out that the
revised regulations will have little effect. For example, in
the impact matrices provided in Appendix E of the EIS it is
stated (p. A-115):
“For most types and sizes of mining activities the proposed
regulations received a relatively small negative score (Table
E-3). For small mining operations, specifically Notice-level
operations, adverse effects are expected to be somewhat
higher than for the larger operations...Except for financial
guarantee requirements, large operations would not be
affected by these proposed regulation changes.”
(emphasis added)
Further, in discussions of its mine cost models, the
EIS states (A-123) in the context of discussing its exploration
model (although exploration is frequently a Notice-level
activity, large scale exploration projects require Plans of
operations):
“Impacts to exploration would be slight because BLM and
industry are already generally following these procedures
in authorizing operations and accepting regulations.”
Similarly, in the context of its discussion of its placer
mining model, the EIS (p. A-130) states:
“Impacts to the industry would be minimal because BLM
and industry are generally following these procedures in
authorizing operations and accepting final closure and
reclamation.”
Virtually the same phrase can also be found on page
A-139 with respect to the BLM’s strip mine model and on
page A-151 with respect to its open pit mine model. While
these repeated statements are likely intended to assure
operators that the revised regulations will not impose large
costs, the obvious question these statements raise, from the
perspective of quantifying the benefits of the proposed
regulations to the environment is, if the regulations are
relatively benign, then what benefit will they provide to the
environment?  Furthermore, if operators operating with Plans
of Operations issued under the old regulations could improve
environmental protection at virtually no cost, why would
they not already be doing it?  Again, the unanswered question
is what harm was being done to the environment that the
revised regulations will avoid?
The EIS does make a number of statements about
“Alternative 1: No Action” and “Alternative 2: State
Management” which appear to be indictments of the
current regulations and western state regulatory oversight
without saying, specifically, where the system has failed.
As a consequence, it is not possible to determine what
environmental costs have been incurred and which of these
would be avoided. For example, on page 119 the EIS
states:
“The Revised regulations would not change the existing
framework of federal and state laws that protect water
resources. It would, however, increase protective measures
for water resources and reduce the risk of water resource
contamination by implementing tighter controls ...”
Since, as noted above, Congress and the courts have
repeatedly affirmed the states’ right to regulate water, it is
difficult to imagine how the revised regulations can tighten
controls without changing the “existing framework of federal
and state laws that protect water resources.” One possible
answer to this question comes from the EIS’s repeated
references to performance standards. That is, through the
establishment of
“performance standards that are mainly outcome based,
describing the resource condition that must be achieved
or the performance a particular operating component must
meet...,” (p. 42)
the regulations can specify some post-mining
environmental quality.
This, however, was already done, but under the
auspices of state laws. Federal standards would, in effect,
create a uniform standard across all western public lands
states. States, however, argued through the Western
Governor’s Association that this would offer little or no
benefit because a single standard across states with disparate
climatic, geological and other conditions from Alaska to
Arizona, for example, would not be practical. The EIS did
not address the issue of how uniform performance standards
would be flexible enough to avoid unnecessary prohibition
of beneficial mineral industry activities in places where
standards may be too stringent, or prevent undue and
unnecessary environmental degradation where they may be
too loose.26
Moreover, in public hearings on the proposed
regulations as well as in the statements above, the BLM
implied that its performance standards are generally in
conformance with existing state regulations. So, again, there
does not appear to be any significant net benefit to the
environment that will be achieved for Plan level operations
by the revised regulations.
One performance standard the EIS notes has
environmental benefit refers to the backfilling of open-pit
mines (p. 44). The revised regulations establish a
presumption of backfilling open pits after mining is
completed and, indeed, the open-pit cost model in Appendix
E assumes backfilling. The language in EIS presumes that
failing to backfill a pit causes environmental damage that
would be remediated by backfilling.
The latter presumption flies directly in the face of
BLM’s own study of backfilling (BLM, 1998) which points
out that open pits can have desirable environmental
consequences. For example, high pit walls provide raptor
habitat. Raptors have located in the high walls of at least
one Nevada operation during operational phase and the BLM
study suggests reclamation techniques to enhance high wall
suitability as raptor habitat after mine closure. Further, pit
floors, because they will accumulate storm runoff, will
generally provide enhanced habitat for raptor prey in arid
areas. In short, as long as toxic materials are not left exposed,
which is currently not allowed, backfilling may be expected
to reduce biodiversity in the mine area.
In cases where pit lakes form, after treatment, pit lakes
and wetlands can also create wildlife habitat and, potentially,
recreation areas. This, of course, is not to suggest that this
would universally be the case. But it does call to question
the presumption in the EIS that backfilling should be
required unless it is not feasible. Any benefits from
backfilling need to be carefully weighed against the
environmental benefits that can be gained from a more
reasoned approach. The EIS does suggest that it intends a
more reasoned approach with various statements but the
actions of the BLM has created numerous skeptics.
With these points in mind, the revised regulations
offer benefits to the public of preventing undue and
unnecessary degradation of public lands resulting from
Notice Level activities that were allowed under the old
regulations. Furthermore, the bonding requirement in the
revised regulations offers the public the further safeguard
of providing funds that would allow the BLM to direct and
fund the cleanup of sites previously disturbed under Notices
of Intent.
An analysis of the benefits of the revised regulations,
it is argued, requires a close examination of the record of
the industry under the old regulations to identify undue and
unnecessary environmental degradation that can be avoided.
This examination would include industry conduct under the
old regulations and the nature and frequency of Notice Level
disturbances found to be in noncompliance with these
regulations. The nature and frequency of noncompliance
under the old regulations are discussed in general terms in
the EIS. The EIS also provides projections of Notice Level
activities that would be in noncompliance both with and
without the revised regulations.
Analysis and quantification of environmental benefits
derived from the revised regulations of Plan Level activities,
however, is problematic since the EIS provides no specific
information on past costs and how they will be avoided.
Indeed, it is curious to suggest, as the EIS and the BLM B-
C Analysis imply, that the revised regulations will result in
significant benefits at virtually no cost to operators. If this
were the case, operators would have already voluntarily
taken the steps needed to provide improved environmental
quality at no significant cost. In short, the data provided by
the EIS is nebulous and does not lend itself to quantification.
Hence, the following focuses on the only specific
information provided.
As indicated, it is argued that an analysis of the
benefits of regulatory actions should, as a matter of
reasonableness, be based on the actual net marginal benefits
that the proposed regulatory actions are likely to produce.
In this case, it has been further argued, these benefits consist
of avoiding undue and unnecessary degradation that was
caused by Notice Level activities on the public lands under
the old regulations. Since the revised regulations do not
demonstrably raise performance standards on Notice Level
activities, the impacts on public lands of Notice Level
activities that comply with current performance standards
cannot be considered benefits. Furthermore, any impacts
related to larger scale disturbance of public lands, affecting
more than five acres, already requires a Plan of Operations
and would continue to under the revised regulations. Hence,
environmental benefits measured in terms of avoided undue
and unnecessary environmental degradation from Plan Level
uses of public lands are not expected to change under the
revised regulations.
In examining the BLM B-C Analysis, it is apparent
that BLM analysts have, for the most part, used a different
measure of benefits than that proposed above. For example,
in one instance (p. 54) the BLM B-C Analysis used
environmental damage caused in the Clark Fork Basin in
Montana as an illustration of measuring environmental
damages using the contingent value method. This is not to
suggest anything wrong with contingent value methodology;
the problem is that the operations that caused environmental
damages in the Clark Fork Basin in central Montana could
not be permitted under the old regulations. Hence, assuming
a 0.05% chance of producing a situation with 10% of the
severity of the kind of environmental conditions that exist
in Anaconda and Butte is taking a valid study out of context.
The kind of tailings disposal employed at Anaconda,
where toxic metals are allowed to run off into streams simply
would not be allowed under the Clean Water Act and
regulations promulgated under it as well as other acts. In27
other words, environmental damage in the Clark Fork Basin
has nothing to do with 3809 regulations. In addition, a
tailings impoundment that could be built under the old
regulations could not be built under a Notice of Intent. It
would require a Plan of Operations that, as noted above, are
not materially affected by the revised regulations.
Furthermore, the type of tailings impoundment at the Clark
Fork Basin could not be permitted under the old 3809
regulations. Therefore, the environmental damage in the
Clark Fork Basin, or even a small percentage of that
environmental damage cannot reasonably be used as a
measure of the benefits of the proposed regulations.
The same criticism applies to the use of other studies
of water quality in the BLM B-C Analysis. Without
questioning the validity of the studies referred to on Table
22, p. 61 of the BLM B-C Analysis, it is not clear what they
have to do with the benefits of the revised regulations. As
with the analysis based on the Clark Fork Basin in Montana
noted above, the analysis of potential impacts of mining on
water quality described on p. 61 is based on an assumption
concerning potential catastrophic events. The problem with
this formulation of the potential benefits of the revised
regulations is that the regulatory changes will not reduce
the probability of a catastrophic event affecting Notice or
Plan level activities. Consequently, the elimination of these
potential events cannot be considered a benefit of the revised
regulations. Nor, for that matter, could Notice level
activities, which largely consist of mineral exploration,
create conditions that could trigger much environmental
damage even in a catastrophic event like an earthquake,
landslide or flood.
As the EIS points out on pages 92 and 93, the major
changes envisioned by the revised regulations would require,
in some cases, Plans of Operations for some activities that
could previously be conducted under Notices. In addition,
the revised regulations would require bonding for Notice
Level operations. The problem with this analysis is that the
types of activities described such as building a tailings
impoundment, could not be done under a Notice under the
old regulations. In addition, the tailings impoundment
referred to in the Clark Fork Basin could not get approved
under the old regulations. Consequently, the types of
groundwater and drinking water contamination described
on page 61 of the BLM B-C Analysis would not be avoided
by the revised regulations and, therefore, cannot be
considered as benefits.
Reassessing the Benefits of Regulatory Reform
The first objective of the alternative analysis of benefits to
be offered is a reformulation of the problem. Specifically,
assuming the proposed regulations work perfectly by
avoiding all undue and unnecessary environmental
degradation, what environmental costs will be avoided?  The
answer, at least in part, can be found in the EIS. The BLM
B-C Analysis does not suggest that mining activities that
meet existing environmental regulations pose environmental
threats but refers to the possibility of accidents and the
industry’s record of noncompliance as the source of
environmental costs and, hence, benefits to be achieved by
the revised regulations.
Hence, the relevant data are the cost of noncompliance
under the old regulations. According to the EIS, from 1981
to 1997 on all BLM lands in the U.S., 948 Notices of
noncompliance have been issued; 690 (38 per year) of these
for Notice level operations and 258 (15 per year) for Plan
level operations.
Looking just at the Notice Level violations because,
according the EIS, Plan Level activity will be unaffected;
the EIS provides a breakdown of the nature of the violations:
72% for failure to reclaim
15% for operational problems
13% for failure to file a Notice
The EIS further indicates that the average Notice
affects 2.12 acres.
The BLM B-C Analysis focuses on contingent value
and willingness to pay analyses for values of affected
environmental resources. This methodology attempts to put a
value on these resources. However, as a practical matter,
society should bear no cost higher than the cost of mitigating
the damage caused by noncompliance. The BLM analysis is
analogous to assuming that, if the water pump goes out on a
$30,000 automobile, the cost is $30,000, when, in fact, the
cost is the several hundred dollars that it costs to replace the
water pump. What needs to be done, in our view, involves
verifying the nature and extent of noncompliant Notice Level
activities, their cleanup costs, and trends in rates of compliance
with the old 3809 regulations. The discussion below focuses
on seven scenarios for the purpose of estimating the costs of
undue and unnecessary degradation and the expected benefits
of the revised regulations. These scenarios are summarized
in Table 6.
Note that Table 6 shows the results of the following
calculations using a 3 percent discount rate as was used in
the BLM B-C Analysis. Also, like the BLM B-C Analysis,
the benefit estimates below do not include “non-use” values
or values associated with impacts on wildlife habitat and
aesthetic values. Unlike the BLM analysis, however, we do
not argue that these unquantified values are significant.
Given the nature of Notice Level activities, i.e., small scale,
short term, and generally out of public view, we would argue
that these values are generally negligible. Most Notice Level
activities would be exploration, which typically involves
leveling a thousand-square-foot, or 0.023-acre pad to place
a mobile drill on and grading a crude access road. The latter
typically accounts for a majority of the average 2.12 acres
of disturbance. After exploration is completed, the area is
recontoured and, if appropriate, revegetated.28
1. Nevada 64,400 549,332
2. USFS D1 (Exp.) 38 2.12 3,140 72% 182,130
D2 (Op.) 38 2.12 3,640 15% 43,986
D3 (FF) 38 2.12 3,225 13% 675
Total 226,791 1,934,530
3. Net Benefits
D1 (Exp.) 8 2.12 3,140 72% 38,343
D2 (Op.) 8 2.12 3,640 15% 9,260
D3 (FF) 8 2.12 3,225 13% 142
Total 47,746 407,269
4.  Post 1993 Rates
D1 (Exp.) 6 2.12 3,140 72% 28,757
D2 (Op.) 6 2.12 3,640 15% 6,945
D3 (FF) 6 2.12 3,225 13% 107
35,809 305,452
5.  Maximum Case
D1 (Exp.) 38 2.12 5,000 72% 290,016
D2 (Op.) 38 2.12 10,000 15% 120,840
D3 (FF) 38 2.12 5,850 13% 1,225
Total 412,081 3,515,054
6.  Break-Even Case
D1 (Exp.) 38 2.12 71,900 72% 4,170,430
D2 (Op.) 38 2.12 143,800 15% 1,737,679
D3 (FF) 38 2.12 84,123 13% 17,620
Total 5,925,729 50,546,471
7.  Net Break-Even Case
D1 (Exp.) 8 2.12 341,500 72% 4,170,125
D2 (Op.) 8 2.12 683,000 15% 1,737,552
D3 (FF) 8 2.12 399,555 13% 17,619
Total 5,925,296 50,542,771
Table 6.  Estimated benefits of regulatory changes
# Area Unit Cost Freq. Annual 10 Yr. PV
 (acres) ($/acre) Total Cost (@ 3%)
Scenario #1.  Cases of Noncompliance in Nevada
In an effort to examine the nature of noncompliance with
the old regulations a list of “BLM-Nevada State Record of
Environmental Problems Associated with Notice-Level
Mining or Exploration” was obtained and screened by a
professional engineer familiar with mining sites and
involved in the reclamation business in Nevada. The list
was provided to Nevada Assemblywoman Marcia deBraga
(chair of the Nevada Assembly Committee on Natural
Resources, Agriculture and Mining) by Nevada State BLM
officials.
The list contains 156 Notice Level disturbances
consisting of 90 for which a Record of Noncompliance was
issued, 25 for which a Notice of Noncompliance was issued,
and 41 of which are described as “miscellaneous.”  These
problem Notice Level activities, however, consisted of 138
sites since some sites had multiple Notices. In the screening
it was determined that 112 (81 percent) probably were actually
mining-related activities, primarily exploration, that had
occurred under 3809 regulations between 1981 when the old
regulations were promulgated and 1997. The balance were
either not Notice Level disturbances because they exceeded
the 5-acre limit, disturbances that predated 3809 regulations,
i.e., historical mining and nonmining disturbances, such as
trespass on public lands for other purposes, and a few cases
where private funds have been used to already reclaim the
disturbance. Based on this screening, a cost estimate of
$1,095,000 for reclaiming 124 of the sites that appeared to
be Notice level mining activity was provided.29
Since 3809 regulations allowing Notice Level
activities have been in existence for approximately 17 years,
it would appear that the annual damage done to public lands
in Nevada by noncompliant mining activity is approximately
$64,400. Further, as a first approximation, this could also
be considered the annual benefit of the revised regulations
in Nevada, where most exploration on public lands occurs
in the U.S., if the revised regulations succeed in avoiding
all such undue and unnecessary degradation in the future.
Over a ten-year period, discounted at 3 percent, the present
value of this avoided cost would be a paltry $549,300.
Scenario #2.  Estimated Benefits Using USFS
Bonding Standards
In a further effort to investigate the actual expected benefit,
reclamation costs from a company operating on U.S. Forest
Service (USFS) lands were examined. These costs were
examined because USFS lands tend to be in more
mountainous terrain, which adds to reclamation costs and
involves more sensitive habitat. Figures examined were from
a reclamation plan approved for bonding by the USFS.
Costs of recontouring and revegetating lands
disturbed by exploration activities, the primary activity
currently allowed in Notice Level disturbances on BLM
lands and the activity that would be affected by the proposed
rule, varied by the steepness of terrain. The steepest terrain,
in excess of 45 percent slope, recontouring cost
approximately $6,000 per acre. This figure is considerably
higher than the per-acre costs used to derive the cost estimate
above and does not include revegetation, which is estimated
to add an additional $240 per acre. These recontouring and
revegetation costs range down to approximately $700 per
acre for land with zero to ten percent slope. The mean cost
weighting four categories of terrain equally was
approximately $3,140 per acre.
Using rates of noncompliance on Notice level
activities provided by the EIS (BLM, 1999a, Table 3-6, p.
88) of 690 (38 per year) from 1981 to 1997, average area of
disturbance (2.12 acres), and the breakdown of the type of
disturbance provided by the EIS, the expected annual cost
of failures to reclaim Notice level exploration activities
would be:
D1 = (38)(2.12 ac.)($3,140)(0.72) = $182,130.
This estimate, however, does include noncompliant
activities described in the EIS as “operational problems.”
These can include more significant activities ranging from
major recontouring to cleanup of hazardous chemical left
on sites. The latter, however, is less likely and was a very
small proportion of the sites provided on the Nevada BLM
list for Nevada. In an effort to estimate these costs the
bonding costs for mining operations on USFS lands were
examined since this would be an example of major regrading.
These costs were $3,640 per acre. This would yield an
estimate of the cost of “operational problems” of:
D2 = (38)(2.12 ac.)($3,640)(0.15) = $43,986.
Finally, the estimate of the benefits of the revised
regulations needs to consider the remaining 13 percent of
incidents of noncompliance that are described in the EIS as a
failure to file a Notice. Since the EIS does not indicate a rate
at which these incidents result in undue and unnecessary
damage one assumption would be that they result in damage
in the same proportion as all other Notice level activities.
That is, 2 percent of Notice Level activities result in undue
and unnecessary damage, and of these, damage is proportional
to cases where the cause of damage is known (83 percent of
the damage is the result of a failure to reclaim and 17 percent
from operational problems). These assumptions use a
weighted average of the two calculations above and would
yield an estimate of damage to the public lands that could be
avoided of:
D3 = (38)(2.12 ac.)(0.02)(.13)(($3,140)(0.83)
+($3,640)(0.17)) = $675
Combining these categories of estimated annual
damage that could be avoided yields estimated total annual
undue and unnecessary damage of:
Dusfs = D1 + D2 + D3 =  $226,791
Following the methodology used in the EIS for
comparative purposes (Table 25 of the BLM B-C Analysis),
this would imply a present discounted value of damage that
could be avoided over a ten-year period, discounted at 3
percent, of $1,934,530.
Scenario #3.  Net Benefits of the Revised
Regulations
The EIS (BLM, 1999a, p. 93) indicates that under the revised
regulations, there will be 600 notices of noncompliance over
the next 20 years (30 per year). Since the record of the
industry since 1981 indicates a rate of 38 per year, this
indicates that the Revised regulations will result in a net
benefit of a reduction in cases of noncompliance of eight
per year. Using this assumption, the calculation (as indicated
on the accompanying table) yields a net damage estimate,
based on the BLM’s own estimate of the effectiveness of its
revised regulations of:
Dnet = D1 + D2 + D3 =  $47,746
This would imply a present discounted value of
damage that could be avoided over a ten-year period,
discounted at 3 percent, of $407,269.30
Scenario #4.  Trends in Noncompliance
An extremely important point to consider in the effect of
the revised regulations is the trend in noncompliance with
existing 3809 regulations. The BLM’s EIS indicates, as noted
above, that there will be 600 notices of noncompliance over
the next 20 years. However, an examination of the list of
Notices of Noncompliance in Nevada indicates that of the
156 Notice of Noncompliance issued between 1981 and
1997, only 11 have been since 1993, and one of these is for
a non-mining use of public lands. Hence, over the most
recent five-year period available for analysis, there have been
two mining-related notices of noncompliance in Nevada per
year. Since Nevada accounts for 39 percent of total Notices
(BLM, 1999a, Table 3-4, p. 87), this would imply a national
rate of six per year on public lands over the 1993-97 period,
and half of these occurred in 1993.
The significance of 1993 is that it was in that year
that Congress eliminated the $100 work assessment and
adopted the $100 per year holding fee. As a practical matter,
the elimination of the $100 per year diligence requirement
meant that claim holders were no longer required to conduct
$100 worth of work to maintain their claims. As a result,
claim holders were no longer required to cut roads and dig
exploration trenches to satisfy assessment standards. This
change apparently resulted in a significant reduction in
disturbances that could be considered undue and unnecessary
degradation if no further exploration work is done and the
disturbances were not reclaimed.
Based on the rate of noncompliance since 1993, the
annual gross cost of noncompliance, which would represent
the annual undue and unnecessary degradation avoided by
the revised regulations of:
Dpost’93= D1 + D2 + D3 =  $35,809
This would imply a present discounted value of
damage that could be avoided over a ten-year period,
discounted at 3 percent, of $305,452.
It should also be pointed out that the 1993–1997 rate
of noncompliance in Nevada is less than the rate of
noncompliance projected for the next 20 years by the BLM
under the revised regulations. As noted above, the EIS (p.
93) indicates that under the revised regulations, over the next
20 years, there will be 600 notices of noncompliance (30
per year). This would imply that under the revised regulations
would result in 24 more violations per year than occurred
under the old regulations after the $100 per year work
assessment was replaced with the $100 per year holding fee.
We do not intend to imply that the revised regulations
will result in more undue and unnecessary environmental
degradation, which is what the numbers provided by the
BLM would imply. But, if we did combine post-1993 trends
with the trends projected in the EIS it would show an increase
in undue and unnecessary environmental degradation as a
result of the revised regulations.
Scenario #5.  Maximum Case
It can be argued that the bonding costs used above
undervalue undue and unnecessary degradation of the
environment by mining-related uses of public lands.
Consequently, the next three scenarios look at the upper
bounds of the potential benefits of the revised regulations.
In what is referred to as a “maximum case” we use
what is considered to be the most it could reasonably cost
per acre of disturbance to reclaim Notice Level activities
on the average number of noncompliant uses of public lands
for the 1981 to 1997 period. In this case, estimates of $5,000
per acre for reclaiming exploration activities (D1) and
$10,000 per acre for operational problems (D2) were used.
Estimates for damages resulting from failure to file a Notice
were again calculated as the weighted average of the above
proportionate to their occurrence. These assumptions yield
an estimate of annual damage of:
Dmax = D1 + D2 + D3 =  $412,081.
This would imply a present discounted value of
damage that could be avoided over a ten-year period,
discounted at 3 percent, of $3,515,054. The significance of
this figure is that if avoided costs are measured in terms of
the most that it could reasonably cost to mitigate the damages
caused by Notice Level activities on federal lands, these
benefits would only amount to 0.2 percent of BLM’s low
estimate of annual industry output lost and 0.5 percent of
BLM’s low estimate of the annual household income lost
from the revised regulations.
Scenario #6.  Break Even Case
An alternative analysis of the upper bounds of potential
damages caused by violations of the old 3809 regulations
that might be prevented by the revised regulations can be
viewed in terms of asking what the damage would have to
be to break even from a benefit-cost perspective. The BLM
B-C Analysis indicates (p. 67) that the lower bounds of the
present value of the costs of implementing the revised
regulations (using a 15 percent discount rate) are $50.5
million. In the Break Even Case analysis, we have sought
to determine what unit costs, in terms of damage done per
acre, would have to be assumed to justify incurring what
the BLM’s analysis indicates is the minimum cost of
implementing the revised regulations.
In developing these estimates it has been assumed
that environmental damage done by “operational problems”
(D2) are twice as costly as failure to reclaim exploration
activities. Although this approach is somewhat arbitrary, it
is useful in addressing criticisms of both the BLM and this
analysis for failure to consider nonuse and other
unquantifiable environmental amenity values.
As indicated on the accompanying table, the implied
unit costs of all such violations would have to be $71,90031
per acre for exploration related damages and $143,800 for
operations related damages. This assumed level of damages
would produce a gross benefit estimate of:
Dgb-e = D1 + D2 + D3 =  $5,925,729
Scenario #7.  Net Break Even Case
As with the discussion of net benefits above, the damage
estimates in the breakeven case are calculated on a gross
basis. That is, the benefit estimates above, in terms of
damages avoided, are only valid if it is assumed that the
revised regulations will eliminate all damages associated
with violations. As also discussed above, if the bonding of
Notice Level activities proposed in the revised regulations
were adopted, this might be substantially achieved.
However, the EIS indicates that even if the revised
regulations were undertaken, there would still be 30
violations per year so that the net benefit would be eight
cases of noncompliance avoided.
Using these assumptions, the estimated approximate
level of assumed damages per acre of disturbance implied
for the avoided costs to approximately equal the minimum
cost estimated by the BLM of $50.5 million. As indicated
on Table 6, the implied unit costs of all such violations would
have to be $341,500 per acre for exploration related damages
and $683,000 for operations related damages. These
assumed levels of damages would produce a gross benefit
estimate of:
Dnb-e = D1 + D2 + D3 =  $50,542,771
It is probably not necessary to point out, but as a
practical matter, the latter two damage estimates exceed the
costs of cleaning major Superfund sites such as the Clark
Fork Basin, which the BLM refers to in its analysis. For
example, construction of the Old Works golf course at
Anaconda, Montana on an abandoned millsite cost $44
million to reclaim 250 acres, or $176,000 per acre. The
quality of reclamation done in this instance far exceeds
anything that would be necessary for reclamation of
disturbances caused by activities carried out under either a
Notice of Intent or a Plan of Operations under the old
regulations. Another well-known example of reclamation
of noncompliant operations is at Summitville, Colorado,
where a Plan of Operations was violated and led to
significant water quality degradation. In that case, cleanup
costs are estimated at $150 million for approximately 650
acres for a cost of $231,000 per acre.
Hence, it is possible for costs to reach the levels
necessary to break even with the costs the BLM projects
the revised regulations will have, but it was not likely under
the old regulations. Note that the cleanup costs in the Clark
Fork Basin were for activities that could not be permitted
under current regulations. In the case of Summitville,
damage was the result of noncompliance with a Plan of
Operations and the failure of regulators to utilize existing
enforcement powers.
In assessing the various scenarios above it is important
to recognize that the provision in the revised regulations that
offers the most benefit to the environment is the bonding
requirement. This conclusion conforms to the findings and
recommendations of the NRC report referred to above. Here
too, the revised regulations are limited in their ability to
protect the environment. Bonding costs are based on an
assumption of compliance. When operators on Notice level
or Plan level disturbances are out of compliance, bonding
levels will likely be inadequate. What is required to avoid
undue and unnecessary environmental damage is greater
utilization of existing oversight and enforcement powers. The
revised regulations simply cannot prevent regulatory failure.
In conclusion, this analysis of the benefits of the
revised regulations finds that the BLM’s estimates of benefits
to be grossly exaggerated and only tenuously related to what
the revised regulations can actually achieve. We believe that
a more careful analysis of what the revised 3809 regulations
can actually achieve would yield much more modest
benefits, and levels of benefits that cannot justify either the
economic losses or the costs of implementing the regulations.
The Millsite Opinion
In November 1997, USDI Solicitor Leshy issued an opinion
that mining operations were limited to one five-acre millsite
claim for each 20-acre mining claim. A millsite claim is
land in the vicinity of the orebody that is used for mills,
other processing facilities such as heap leach pads, holding
ponds, tailings impoundments, waste dumps and other
necessary facilities. A millsite claim is distinguished from a
mining claim in that it does not establish a right to underlying
mineral rights. Indeed, an operator would not want to put
these facilities on a mining claim because they would likely
have to be moved to mine the underlying minerals.
In issuing the opinion the Solicitor invoked the intent
of the Mining Law. Curiously, since the passage of the
Mining Law mining operators have been allowed as many
millsite claims as were reasonably necessary to develop the
mineral resource. Indeed, the BLM Manual (BLM, 1991)
in effect at the time the ruling was issued stated that “[t]here
is no limit to the number of millsites that can be held by a
single claimant.” (§ 3864.1.B). Of course, there is no limit
to the number of mining claims that a single claimant may
hold either, providing that they are valid claims, which means
they can be mined at a profit. The upshot of the opinion,
however, is that there can be no more than a one-to-one
correspondence between the number of mining claims and
millsite claims.
The significance of this opinion is that it could make
the Mining Law unworkable in some cases, in the sense of
making mining impractical. The mitigating circumstances32
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Figure 8.  Monthly average London PM gold fix, 1992–2001 (www.kitco.com).
would be when an operator has private land available to
use for necessary facilities or if the federal agency, the USFS
or BLM is willing to sell, lease or swap needed land. The
latter, of course, simply expands the prerogatives of the
federal agency to deny an operating permit in cases where
operators do not have access to private lands, which is
frequently the case.
The reason the opinion renders the mining law
unworkable is most easily seen in the case of waste rock
dumps where operators place nonmineralized overburden
and other materials that cannot be processed or tailings
impoundments where they place materials that have already
been processed. In these cases it is physically impossible to
take materials out of a 20-acre area and place all of it on a
5-acre area. Physical restrictions on the slope of waste rock
piles dictate that traditional engineering practices simply
would not be allowed in spite of the fact that these practices
have generally had no deleterious environmental impact
other than to alter terrain.
Like the revised 3809 regulations, the millsite opinion
is clearly an attempt to thwart new mine development on
public lands or, at least, give federal land managers more
discretion to block new mine development. Hence, it appeals
to one of the complaints frequently heard from
environmental interest groups that the mining laws give
mineral development the highest priority use of the land.
This frequently heard claim is only true in a very limited
sense, however. Congress has removed millions of acres of
land from mineral entry to create parks, monuments,
wilderness, and other uses based on their special
characteristics and amenity values. These regulations simply
give regulators and the public another chance to block
mineral entry. These factors add uncertainty to an already
risky venture and create greater incentives for mining
companies to reduce their investments in the U.S.
Also like the revised 3809 regulations, the millsite
opinion generates little or no benefit to the public or the
environment other than limiting an otherwise lawful activity.
Existing mines will be largely unaffected, only future mining
would be affected if the opinion stands legal challenges and
the change of administration. A new solicitor could simply
issue a new opinion. One thing is certain, however, both of
these public policy issues will remain hotly contested issues
in a divisive political environment.
As the discussion of production costs above indicated,
industry efforts to cut costs and the closure of high cost
operations have largely succeeded in maintaining gross
operating margins. These cost-cutting efforts and the closure
of high cost producers have, of course, been necessitated
by low gold prices (Fig. 8) and have allowed the industry to33
recover somewhat from fairly dismal financial performances
in the immediate aftermath of the fall in prices in 1996 and
1997. Nonetheless, the industry’s financial performance and
the prospects for its sustainability in the long run have been
overshadowed by the events in the public policy arena
described above and the precipitous decline in precious
metals prices since 1996.
Gold Prices
Advocates of mining law and regulatory reform affecting
the industry have generally denied that these reforms
adversely impact the industry and that, if they do, the damage
is only marginal. Rather, the blame for falling industry output
and declining U.S. exploration expenditures is laid at the
feet of: i) gold markets and, specifically, weak prices, and
ii) the dubious proposition that all of the gold in the U.S.
has already been discovered. (The latter explanation for
declining exploration expenditures was made to the author
in person by a former director of the BLM in the Clinton
administration.)  The second explanation for declining U.S.
exploration is belied by both continued U.S. exploration in
the face of significant political and regulatory uncertainty
and, more significantly, continued exploration successes.
However, there is certainly some credence to the effects of
weak gold prices.
Weak gold prices are an obvious problem facing the
industry. And, while the principal purpose of this study has
never been to provide an in-depth analysis of gold markets,
it is worth addressing in some detail to distinguish between
the effects of gold prices on the U.S. industry and
environmental regulations.
Two long-term trends in gold markets are
unmistakable. First, over the past two decades worldwide
industry production has increased substantially, from 31
million ounces (962 tonnes) in 1980, (Murray and others,
1990) to 82.8 million ounces (2,576 tonnes) in 1999
(Klapwijk and others, 2000), a 160 percent increase. Much
of this increase occurred in the 1980s. Since 1989, mine
supply has increased from 66.3 to 82.8 million ounces (2,063
to 2,576 tonnes), a 25 percent increase.
The second trend is of more recent origin is the
increase in the supply of physical gold into the market from
above-ground sources, principally central bank sales and
lending by central banks and private bullion banks to
facilitate producer hedging. Total supply in 1981 was 39.6
million ounces (1,231 tonnes) and grew to 131.6 million
ounces (4,093 tonnes) in 1999, a 332 percent increase.
Hence, the growth in total supply, augmenting mine output
with above-ground supplies sold into the market, has far
outstripped growth in mine supply.
The first trend, the increase in world mine production,
in itself cannot completely explain price declines since prices
remained in the mid $300 range for most of this period. It
appears that the world market was willing to absorb rising
mine supply for various reasons, but principally because of
rising Asian affluence and demand. In addition, during most
of the 1980s central banks were buyers of gold, taking a net
32.1 million ounces (998 tonnes) off of the market during
the decade. The periods during the past decade that saw the
sharpest declines in prices, such as 1992 and 1997, were
also periods during which there were sharp marginal
increases in supply from above-ground sources. In the case
of 1992, supply from above-ground sources increased by
29 percent from the previous year with the principal source
of marginal increase being central bank sales coincident with
the signing of the Maastrich agreement which set the ground
rules for creating the single European currency. 1992 central
bank sales hit their highest level of the decade at almost 20
million ounces (622 tonnes), up from 3.6 million ounces
(111 tonnes) in the previous year. In the case of 1997, supply
from above-ground sources increased by over 50 percent
from the previous year. In this case, however, the culprits
were a 350-percent increase in producer hedging and a 36-
percent increase in central bank sales over the previous year.
These marginal changes in supply are shown on
Figure 9. The left axis the figure shows Annual Change in
Tonnes Supplied by source of supply: mine supply (∆MS),
official sales (∆OS), and hedging (∆H). The right hand axis
shows Year-to-Year Changes in Gold Prices (∆P). Note that
changes in mine supply (∆MS) have been relatively steady
with the largest year over year increase in mine supply
occurring in the first year shown, 1989. After that, changes
in supply coming from underground have been modest
compared to changes in supply coming from hedging and
official sales.
Note that official sales reached a peak in 1992,
coinciding with years of low gold prices. A sharp drop in
official sales in the next two years also coincided with
improving prices. Since 1995, however, official sales have
been relatively constant source of supply and, given the
agreement reached among European central banks in late
1999, this is expected to continue.
Again since 1995, the most destabilizing element of
supply in the market has been producer hedging, fluctuating
in seesaw fashion from 1995 to 1999. Price declines in 1997
coincided with a sharp increase in hedging but subsequent
declines in hedging in the following year were offset by
record increases in supply from scrap (not shown on the
graph) because of the Asian currency crisis.
While this logic seems compelling, it does not stand
up well to statistical analysis. Regressing year-to-year
changes in supply from various sources against changes in
gold prices over the 1989 to 1999 period leads to a different
conclusion. Table 7 presents the results of a relatively simple
statistical analysis of the relationship between changes in
the components of gold supply, namely mine supply, official
sales, supply from all identifiable above-ground sources,
and hedging, and changes in gold prices. The analysis is
limited to annual data that greatly limits what can be done
with the data. Nonetheless, the analysis yields quite
reasonable results.34
Change in Mine Supply -0.118 0.389
(2.40)
Change in Supply from
All Above Ground Sources -0.053 0.221
(1.60)
Change in Supply from
Official Sales -0.059 0.265
(1.80)
Change in Supply from
Hedging -0.008 0.006
(0.23)
Table 7.   Regression analysis of the effects of components of gold supply on prices.
Independent Variables Coefficient R2
(t-statistic)
Dependent Variable – Changes in Average Annual Gold Prices, 1989–1999
Price
Mine Supply
Official Sales
Hedging
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Figure 9.  Annual changes in gold prices, mine supply, official sales, and producer hedging, 1989–99.35
As Table 7 indicates, increases in mine supply were
more strongly correlated to prices than the other variables
examined as indicated by the magnitude of its coefficient.
Changes in mine supply were also the most statistically
significant determinant of price changes with an absolute t-
statistic of 2.40. However, changes in supply from official
sales are also a statistically significant variable.
The difference in the magnitudes of the coefficients
for the variables for mine supply and official sales reflects
nothing more than the differences in the mean annual changes
in supply from the various sources. Changes in supply from
official sales during the 1990s have generally been more
variable and larger in magnitude, hence the lower measure of
statistical significance (t-statistic). Changes in mine supply
have been smaller on a year-to-year basis and less variable to
explain the high t-statistic. Changes in hedging have been the
most variable as discussed above and illustrated by the graph.
This will tend to yield insignificant statistical results but does
not refute the noted destabilizing effect of hedging in the latter
part of the time series.
The results lend some credence to arguments that
central bank actions have been disruptive to markets because
of the high variability of sales in the first half of the 1990s.
However, with growing transparency arising out of the
marketing agreement among European central banks
coordinated by the European Central Bank, this variability
will likely end. The liquidation of European central bank
gold will likely proceed in a more orderly and less disruptive
manner.
The results fail to lend credence to arguments for greater
producer discipline in hedging. However, statistical analyses
should not prevail over reason. While producer hedging has
yielded benefits to some, it has done so when part of a long-
run strategy, most notably in the case of Barrick. Short-run
changes in hedging strategies, however, appear to have been
destabilizing to the market as a whole and have proven to be
ill advised for all market participants. Central bankers, at least,
have realized that discipline is required to unwind their long
position in gold. While it is not likely to be achieved because
of free-rider problems, that is, because it is to the advantage
of individual producers to hedge despite the aggregate impact
on the market, a more orderly and transparent hedging strategy
would clearly benefit the industry.
As occurs in many circumstances, an alternative
theory to fundamental analysis is a conspiracy theory, that a
cabal of bankers and politicians has somehow manipulated
the market. Under the circumstances, however, fundamental
analysis is more than sufficient to explain the decline in
gold prices. Put simply, when central banks, as they did in
1999, endorse an agreement to sell a historically
unprecedented quantity of gold in a relatively short period
of time, there is no compelling reason to hold gold as an
investment vehicle. And, indeed, we have seen a significant
decline in investment demand. The more compelling logic
is to sell before the central banks.
Even more compelling for some speculators given
these market fundamentals in the late 1990s was the “gold
carry trade.”  Speculators borrowed gold from a bullion bank
to sell it into the market, the proceeds were then used to
purchase bonds or stocks. The securities were then sold,
generally at higher prices, to repurchase gold, generally at
lower prices, to repay the bullion loan. As long as gold prices
fell and the market rose, the gold carry trade made money
both ways. Because the gold market is relatively small
compared to other financial markets, practices such as these
undoubtedly exacerbated the decline in gold prices and
destabilized the market. However, the point is that it does
not take a conspiracy to recognize a trading opportunity.
The “shakeout” phase of the long-run cycle for a
perfectly competitive industry confers survival on those with
competitive advantages. In this case, larger, higher-grade,
orebodies, existing operating permits, and lower costs of
production constitute the most significant forms of
competitive advantages. The shakeout phase is significant
in the context of the discussion of gold prices above because
it suggests a decrease in supply from underground sources
and implies upward pressure on prices to meet demand.
Table 8 was constructed to provide a visual and
quantitative perspective on the shakeout. It shows U.S.
precious metals properties that are producing, have
produced, and might have produced gold dating back to the
mid-1990s. The list is fairly complete.
The list shows 1999 gold and silver production and,
when available, gold production for 2000 and gold reserves.
Most significantly, gray cells in the table indicate mine
closures and instances where prospects with reserves were
never developed because, in some cases, of a failure to
secure operating permits or, in other cases, because their
reserves were not reserves at current prices. In some cases,
gray cells also indicate that the prospect is uneconomic
under current operating requirements that raise their costs.
The light gray cells in the table indicate that data are missing
or production is limited to residual production derived from
the rinsing of heaps or production from stockpiles. In several
cases data are missing because of companies in bankruptcy
protection.
U.S. production for 1999 indicated on the table is
approximately 9.4 million ounces (293 tonnes). This figure
misses placer and by-product production with the largest
missing components being gold production from
Kennecott’s Bingham Canyon Mine in Utah and Alaskan
placer production. Assuming that most viable properties
continue their production as planned over the next years,
the gray closure indicators suggest a loss of over 1.2 million
ounces (37 tonnes) of production by 2002, or almost 13
percent of 1999 production.
While this is clearly bad news for operators and
perhaps bankers who have financed marginal operators, we
refer back to our comments on how money is made in this
business. This “adjustment,” while unpleasant in the short36
Table 8.   U.S. Precious Metals Properties. 
 
Production (1,000 oz.)  Reserves (1,000 oz)  
1999 2000 
 
State 
 
Mine 
 
Operator/Source 
 
Partner(s) 
 
Type 
 
Status 
Gold  Silver 
2000 2001  2002 
Gold  Silver 
Alaska 
  Kensington  Coeur d'Alene    UG  D               
  Greens Creek  Kennecott  Hecla UG  P   23.8   3,100.0        403  48000 
  Fort Knox  Kinross    OP  P   351.1    333.6        
California 
  Briggs  Canyon Resources    OP  P   86.7   24.0  86.6      392.3  
  Imperial Glamis  Gold    OP  D               
  Picacho  Glamis Gold    OP  C   6.7             
  Rand  Glamis Gold    OP  P   71.0    99.9      560  
  McLaughlin Homestake    OP  C               
  Hayden Hill  Kinross    OP  C               
  Mesquite Newmont    OP  C   164.6   130.3         
  Castle Mtn.  Viceroy Gold  MKGold OP P    95.0      142.8         
Colorado 
  Cripple Creek  AngloGold   OP  P    231.0    248.0        
Idaho   
  Black Pine  Apollo/Pegasus   OP  C              
  Coeur  Coeur d’Alene   UG  P               
  Galena Coeur d’Alene   UG  P     2,200.0          34400 
  Grouse Creek  Hecla  UG  C               
  Lucky Friday  Hecla  UG  C     4,400.0          25200 
  DeLamar  Kinross   OP  C               
  Beartrack  Meridian    OP  C   133.0     60.0         
  Sunshine Sunshine    UG  C     5,200.0           
Montana 
  Beal Mtn.  Apollo/Pegasus   OP  C              
  Diamond Hill  Apollo/Pegasus   UG  P              
  Montana Tunnels  Apollo/Pegasus   OP  P              
  Zortman  Apollo/Pegasus   OP  C              
  McDonald  Canyon Resources      D               
  Golden Sunlight  Placer Dome    OP  P   144.8     212.3  195.5       
Nevada 
  Newmont NV  Newmont      P   2,498.7     3,047.9  2,703.2     28,037  
  Meikle  Barrick    UG  P   978.0     805.7  668.9     3,816  
  Rodeo-Griffin  Barrick    UG  D             3,900  
  Jerritt Canyon  Meridian  AngloGold OP/UG  P   362.9     343.2  3.26.7      
  Ken Snyder N ewmont    UG  P   260.0   2,068.0   239.3       2,128   26,075   
  Mineral Ridge  Golden Phoenix   OP C               
  Betze-Post Barrick    OP  P   1,130.0     1,646.6  1,611.7     18,000  
  Dee  Glamis Gold    OP  P   31.2             
  Ruby Hill  Barrick    OP  C   124.0     125.2     417  
  Florida Canyon  Apollo/Pegasus   OP  P              
  Pinson  Barrick   OP C               
  Getchell  Getchell       OP  C   111.0             
  Marigold  Glamis Gold    OP  P   54.4     65.5      408.9   
  Goldbanks Kinross     D               
  Hycroft  Vista Gold    OP  C               
  Battle Mtn. Co.  Battle  Mtn   OP  C            
  McCoy/Cove  Echo Bay    OP/UG  C   124.5   8,430.0  162.8  94.6       
  Cortez  Placer Dome  Kennecott  OP  P   1,328.5     1,009.9  1,188.1     5,580  
  Candelaria Kinross    OP  C               
  Denton/Rawhide Dayton  Kennecott  OP  P   126.5             
  Bullfrog  Barrick   UG C               
  Round Mtn.  Echo Bay  Homestake OP  P    541.8    640.1 747.0      5,875  
  Daisy  Glamis Gold    OP  P   28.3     8.7         
  Rochester  Coeur d’Alene   OP  P   88.6   6,200.0        381   52,500 
  Rosebud Hecla  Newmont  UG  C   112.7   247.9           
  Olinghouse  Alta   OP  C               
  Griffon  Alta   OP  C               
  Kinsley  Alta   OP  C               
  Bald Mtn.  Placer Dome    OP  P   105.5     134.5  108.4     1,290  
  Robinson BHP    OP  C               
South Carolina 
  Ridgeway Kennecott     C               
  Haile       C               
South Dakota 
  Homestake     Homestake    UG/OP  P   212.7     170.9         
Utah 
  Mercur  Barrick   OP C               
  Barney's Canyon  Kennecott   OP C               
  Bingham Canyon  Kennecott   O P   P            
Washington 
  Crown Jewel  Crown Resources     D               
  Kettle River  Echo  Bay    UG  P    104.4   94.1  50.3   162  
Total             9,631.3   31,870.0  9,807.9 7,787.1     70,933.2 186,175.0 
 
OP = open pit; UG = underground; C = closed; D = under development; P = producing. 37
1997 1998 1999 2000
Gold Price $ 331  $ 294  $ 279  $ 279
Gold Production (1,000 oz.)*         16,897         16,556         24,244         24,609
Sales** $ 7,327.5  $ 6,615.1  $ 8,671.7  $ 8,794.3
Assets** $ 17,626.7  $ 16,757.5  $ 22,137.6  $ 19,870.2
Equity** $ 10,046.2  $ 9,983.4  $ 11,986.1  $ 9,995.6
Net Income** $ (1,710.7)  $ (1,026.3)  $ 243.1  $ (989.7)
ROE (%) -17.03% -10.28% 2.03% -9.90%
NIBTWD***  $ 326.5  $ 479.6  $ 911.7  $ 862.4
ROE (%) 3.25% 4.80% 7.61% 8.63%
Market Capitalization**  $ 20,251.5  $ 19,293.7  $ 24,035.8  $ 19,727.1
Table 9.  North American gold industry financial indicators, 1997–2000.
* Reflects worldwide production of companies with production in North America
** In millions of U.S. Dollars
*** Net Income before federal taxes and asset write downs (in millions of U.S. Dollars)
run, is necessary and a precursor of better times to come.
Shrinking mine supply will help stabilize prices and offset
the liquidation of central bank reserves.
Profitability
Under the circumstances described above, industry profits
would appear to be a casualty of low gold prices and regulatory
overkill. However, this is not entirely the case. Some higher-
cost producers have, indeed, turned in poor financial
performances over the past few years but, overall, industry
consolidations and rationalization of operations have allowed
the industry to gradually improve aggregate performance.
Table 9 provides a summary of aggregate
performance of 16 publicly held precious metals producers
with operations in the U.S. For 2000 these include:
AngloGold, Barrick Gold, Cambior, Canyon Resources,
Echo Bay Mines, Franco-Nevada, Glamis Gold, Hecla
Mining, Homestake Mining, Kinross Gold, Meridian Gold,
MK Gold, Newmont Mining, Placer Dome, and Vista Gold.
Indicative of the dynamic nature of the industry in the past
few years, financial results for earlier years shown on the
table and in previous studies included Alta Gold (currently
in bankruptcy protection), Rayrock Resources (acquired by
Glamis Gold), Pegasus Gold (in bankruptcy protection and
subsequently reorganized as privately held Apollo Gold),
and Battle Mountain Gold (merged with Newmont Mining)
and Getchell Gold (acquired by Placer Dome). Future reports
will include further changes in the composition of the group
to reflect more recent merger and acquisition activities. For
example, one of the U.S.’s oldest precious metals producers,
Homestake Mining, has recently merged with Barrick Gold
to create the largest North American-based producer. The
Barrick/Homestake combination is the second largest
producer in the world based on 2000 production behind
South African-based AngloGold. In addition, Normandy
Mining, the largest Australian producer, acquired the U.S.
mining operations of Franco-Nevada for approximately 20
percent of its shares of stock outstanding. However, as noted
above, because of Newmont’s acquisition of Normandy in
2002, Normandy will be included as part of Newmont.
Hence, the financial results presented in Table 9 represent
the results for a very dynamic group of firms.
One of the dominant factors in the mergers,
acquisitions, and bankruptcies noted above has been the
decline in gold prices over the period. Another factor,
however, has been the difficulty of replacing U.S. reserves
because of the combined effects of the current regulatory
climate and low prices. This situation creates incentives to
acquire reserves through mergers and acquisitions rather
than risky exploration that may yield deposits that cannot
be developed because of regulatory considerations, e.g.,
Glamis Gold’s Imperial project noted above, Battle
Mountain Gold’s Crown Jewell project in Washington
State, and Canyon Resource’s MacDonald project in
Montana. Given these regulatory risks, producers focus on
acquisition of a company with reserves that have a
reasonable chance of being put into production at current
prices or if prices improve.
Such was the case in Newmont’s merger with Battle
Mountain Gold in which it acquired, in addition to some
foreign operations, the largest known undeveloped gold
deposit in the U.S., Phoenix, virtually in the middle of
Newmont’s current operating area in north central Nevada.
A similar scenario was no doubt envisioned in Placer Dome’s
acquisition of Getchell, which operated a single property in
Nevada, the Getchell Mine. Unfortunately for Placer, it paid
a high price for reserves at an operating mine that it was
forced to close because of high operating costs.38
INDUSTRY OUTLOOK
Another factor driving the consolidation wave is,
quite simply, the point in the price and supply cycle that the
industry finds itself. As noted at the outset, the industry
conforms fairly closely to the economic model of a perfectly
competitive industry. There are many buyers and sellers of
the commodity, and relatively few entry barriers—although
these have been increasing because of regulatory changes.
In these circumstances, we expect investment to flow into
the industry when profits are being earned as in the 1980s
and early 1990s, and flow out of the industry when earnings
fall as they have in the late 1990s.
This latter phase of the cycle is illustrated somewhat
by Table 9 in that we see assets declining over time when
adjusted for production. Note, for example, that in 1998
industry assets declined while production remained
relatively constant. This indicates that, in the aggregate,
nonproductive assets were written down and not replaced
with new investment. Assets increased in the aggregate in
1999; however, this was the result of adding AngloGold,
the world’s largest producer into the group. On a per-ounce
basis, however, industry assets fell from $1,012 in 1998 to
$913 in 1999. This decline continued in 2000, falling to
$807 per ounce. Hence, in aggregate, the industry is writing
down assets and not replacing them through new investment.
In aggregate, the firms in the analysis wrote down $1.85
billion in 2000, or 8.4 percent of the previous year’s assets.
In some cases these write-downs reflect profitable
operators simply acknowledging that investments made
during the early 1990s when prices were high, were not viable
in the current environment. In several cases, however, it
reflects an exit strategy executed by management. That is,
given the phase of the cycle and other factors at work such
as the ages of key members of senior management, the
management of several companies simply decided they
wanted out of the business and sold their operations.
Acquiring companies then proceeded to write down
nonperforming assets. This is the likely explanation of
Glamis Gold’s acquisition of Rayrock, in which Glamis, the
smaller company, used Rayrock’s money to buy it. Similar,
although less extreme, scenarios were involved in the sale
of Getchell to Placer, Battle Mountain Gold to Newmont,
and Franco-Nevada’s sale of its Midas operations in Nevada
to Normandy. The latter got Franco-Nevada out of the mining
business although it retained a large royalty business and
got nearly 20 percent of Normandy in the process.
Further inspection of Table 9 suggests that 1999 and
2000 may well have marked a turning point in the industry.
In spite of low commodity prices and regulatory difficulties
in the U.S., the industry’s return on equity (ROE) on net
income before federal taxes and asset write-downs improved
over the four-year period represented on the table. These
returns on equity are meager for a period in which the general
U.S. economy boomed, and this is one reason why
investment capital has, on net, flowed out of the industry.
However, the trend is clear and likely to continue unless
there are underlying changes in industry fundamentals such
as commodity prices, exploration and production
technologies, etc. Although perhaps counter-intuitive,
profitability is likely to continue to rise during the “shake-
out” phase because the highest cost and least profitable
producers will continue to either drop out of the industry or
be acquired and restructured around their remaining
profitable assets.
Another significant factor in perpetuating this trend
in the current price and regulatory environment is the
increasing offshore investment by North American-based
operators. These offshore investments have, in numerous
cases, yielded relatively low cost operations and projects
that can be put into operation relatively quickly because
operators do not generally face entrenched and well financed
opposition from environmental interest groups. Indeed, host
countries generally welcome the investment and the jobs
and taxes that come with development.
It is perhaps even more counter-intuitive to suggest
that this trend of improving financial results is likely to end
when the current poor fundamentals turn around. For
example, a rise in prices would result in an initial increase in
gross operating margins but it would then induce investment
in marginally profitable projects and the processing of lower
grade ores. Hence, operators would receive higher gross
operating margins on their current production but would see
an increase in operating and development costs that would
dissipate these higher margins and possibly lower overall
profitability.
Clearly, an important element of this review of the outlook
for the U.S. gold industry is surviving the regulators. The
new administration provides a window of opportunity but
not a pardon. It is incumbent upon the industry to make its
case for regulatory and mining law reform that it can live
with. It is not time to claim victory because President
Clinton and Secretary Babbitt have left town. If the industry
is going to advocate more moderate regulatory reform, it is
time for it to redouble its efforts to educate policy makers
and the public.
Foremost on this agenda is addressing the revised
federal Surface Management “3809” Regulations. Much of
the issue here is addressing the presumption in the revised
regulations that mining cannot be conducted in an
environmentally responsible manner. The NRC study in
1999 of existing regulations that found that the current39
system is basically sound should be the industry’s guide.
The industry should address the identified “regulatory gaps,”
with the most significant of these being bonding
requirements. The other key point is that the regulations
issued in January 2001 confer very few environmental
benefits and fail miserably in a cost benefit analysis.
From an economic perspective, bonding requirements
raise industry entry barriers and break down the
characterization of the industry as a perfectly competitive
industry. In other words, this burdens junior companies and
start-ups relative to existing large producers. While these
regulations would be anti-competitive, they would be pro-
environment and pro-existing producers—enhancing
survivability. Junior producers and small miners will object.
Major producers should view this as a matter of survival.
A related problem is counter-party risk in bonding
and the need for short-term financing in the event of
bankruptcies. In the past several years we have seen a
bonding company default and numerous instances where
generally small operators have simply walked away from
mines because of bankruptcies. The danger of bonding
company default is that it could trigger an operator’s
bankruptcy leaving the federal government with unfulfilled
reclamation obligations. The danger in operator bankruptcies
is that frequently pumps for fluid management, monitoring
wells, etc., need to be kept operating for some period of
time after closure. Short-term financing to bear these costs
until a reclamation bond can be released may be necessary
to prevent a variety of problems. Nevada has provided the
industry access to the State’s bond pool for these purposes,
but a broader solution would be better.
There are numerous other issues that divide the major
from the junior and would-be producers. Claim fees, for
example, create an entry barrier for junior producers and
claim holders that would raise the costs of major producers
for acquiring claims if rescinded. The imposition of claim-
holding fees also coincides with a significant decline in
violations of old “3809” regulations. As unpopular as it may
be with small miners and exploration interests, maintaining
$100 per year claim-holding fees is an insurance policy for
major producers against environmental damages.
Other issues not addressed by the NRC study
(National Research Council, 1999) such as royalties can also
be addressed by the industry. It could, for example, create a
fund based on a voluntary net proceeds royalty that the
industry would support and that it would owe if such a
royalty were passed by Congress for the purposes of funding
abandoned mine reclamation. The industry already funds
abandoned mine reclamation in Nevada through claim fees
and voluntary contributions. Why not put those dollars to
use in the federal area where they can deflect some criticism?
The political arena offers numerous risks to the
industry. But, at this point, most of these risks are on the
down side. And, to return to a point made at the outset,
environmental “incidents” like tailings dam failures and
ground and surface water contamination not only generate
external costs on society—which is the terminology
economists use for “pollution” —they generate external
costs for other operators. For example, the tailings dam
failure in Romania becomes the “poster child” for
environmental fundraisers who then use these resources to
prevent mine development in the U.S. and/or hire lawyers
and lobbyists to rewrite surface management regulations.
The point here is that the industry will bear the costs of
these incidents one way or another, directly in the form
of having to meet onerous regulations or indirectly by
paying lawyers and lobbyists to fight onerous regulations,
or both.
Attacks against the Bush administration’s
environmental record on other issues such as ANWR and
arsenic standards promise to steal the headlines from the
mining industry—which is a good thing. But, because the
mining industry has such a small constituency, sustainability
requires that it take advantage of its window of opportunity.40
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